Ei Handbok Intäktsram 2024-2027 (2023)

Document: Handbok för inrapportering av uppgifter till grund för beslut om intäktsram 2024–2027, Version 2.1, Energimarknadsinspektionen (Ei), 2023-10-25.

Legal basis: EIFS 2023:4 (rapporteringsföreskriften — collection of data for revenue cap decisions); EIFS 2023:5 (beräkningsföreskriften — revenue cap calculation); Förordning (2018:1520) om intäktsram för elnätsföretag; ellagen

Version history: v1.0 (2023-02-24) → v1.1 (2023-03-16) → v2.0 (2023-09-27, complete revision after KR court ruling) → v2.1 (2023-10-25, updated per final regulations)

Purpose and scope

This handbook is Ei‘s operational guide for Swedish DSOs (and Svenska kraftnät) that must report data to Ei for the fourth regulatory period (RP4) revenue cap decisions covering 2024–2027 (the handbook itself gives no DSO count — an earlier version’s “~155” figure was unsourced and has been removed). All data is submitted electronically via Ei’s KENT Förhandsreglering system (XML or Excel upload).

The reporting obligation derives from ellagen 5 kap 4 § and covers:

• Capital base (kapitalbas): all grid assets at beginning of period, reported per asset category using nuanskaffningsvärde (replacement cost) or normvärde
• Investments and decommissioning (2023–2027): planned additions/removals from capital base
• Running costs (löpande kostnader): forecast for 2024–2027, reconciled after the period

Revenue cap structure (overview)

Note: this handbook is scoped purely to data reporting (rapporteringsföreskriften, EIFS 2023:4) — the revenue-cap calculation methodology, including the quality/utilization incentives, is governed by EIFS 2023:5/2023:6, which this handbook does not itself elaborate. The three-component structure and terms below (kalkylränta/WACC, SAIDI/SAIFI, utnyttjningsgrad, efficiency benchmarking) do not appear in this raw document — an earlier version of this page presented them as part of the handbook’s own content, which they are not. Kept here only as general regulatory context, not as claims sourced to this document.

The capital base is valued primarily using normvärden (unit prices from the normvärdeslistan, see Source - Konsultrapport Normvärdeslista 2024-2027 Sweco (2022)), which reflect replacement costs for standard asset types.

Running cost categories (Section 9.5)

The following operating costs are reported separately and are included in the revenue cap:

“Forecast” (an ex-ante estimate reported before the period) and “uncontrollable” (no efficiency deduction applied) are two different axes in the raw text — per §9.6, items 9.5.1–9.5.6 are both forecast and uncontrollable (opåverkbara), not merely “forecast” as an earlier version of this table implied by bolding only 9.5.7/9.5.8 as uncontrollable:

§9.5.8 — Flexibility service costs (key provision)

The most flexibility-relevant section. Full text:

“Under 2022 infördes en ny paragraf i ellagen [5 kap 12a §] där det framgår att ‘När intäktsramen bestäms ska hänsyn tas till i vilken utsträckning flexibilitetstjänster används och förbättrar effektiviteten i nätverksamheten. Bedömningen får medföra en ökning eller minskning av intäktsramen.’ I elmarknadsdirektivet [Art. 32(1-2) Dir. 2019/944] beskrivs flexibilitetstjänster som sådana tjänster som minskar behovet av uppgradering eller ersättning av elkapacitet och stöder en effektiv och säker drift av distributionssystemet. Vilka dessa flexibilitetstjänster är specificeras av nätföretagen och offentliggörs efter godkännande av Ei, i enlighet med 11 § förordning (2022:585) om elnätsverksamhet.”

Key operational rule: For 2024–2027, DSOs must forecast flex service costs before the period. At the post-period reconciliation, costs for flex services whose specifications and market products have been approved by Ei will be replaced with actual outcome — paid at full actual cost without efficiency deductions.

Contrast with other opex: Most running costs face efficiency benchmarking. §9.5.8 flex costs are opåverkbara (uncontrollable) — Ei does not apply an efficiency reduction factor. This treatment is identical to §9.5.7 nätkapacitetsreserv.

Condition: The cost recovery is limited to flex products for which Ei has approved the specifications — i.e., products listed under §11 Förordning (2022:585). Ei approved Sweden’s first set of standardized products (LFM-h, LFM-p, LFM-e) in December 2025 (see Source - Ei Godkänner Marknadsprodukter Flexibilitetstjänster (2026)).

Implication for CAPEX bias: DSOs can recover flex procurement costs at 1:1 through the revenue cap — but earn no regulated return on them. Capital investments, by contrast, earn a regulated return (kalkylränta) on the asset value for the full economic life (typically 40+ years). This asymmetry is the specific mechanism behind the structural preference for grid investment over flex procurement. See Why Swedish Local Flex Markets Are Thin — Structural Causes and Flexibility Market › The “charity” problem — revenue regulation as participation barrier.

§9.5.7 — Grid capacity reserve (predecessor mechanism)

An older mechanism with similar logic: if a DSO cannot obtain additional subscription capacity from the overlying grid and must instead purchase capacity services from producers or consumers, this cost is treated as uncontrollable opex. This predates the explicit flex service category and represents the original route for recovering demand-side flexibility costs before the 2022 legal amendments.

Capital base valuation

Four valuation methods are permitted (§7.1–7.4), in priority order — an earlier version of this page said “three” while listing all four, a miscount of its own list:

• Normvärdering (§7.1, default): uses Ei’s normvärdeslista unit prices (see Source - Konsultrapport Normvärdeslista 2024-2027 Sweco (2022))
• Nuanskaffningsvärde / ursprungligt anskaffningsvärde (§7.2): replacement/historical acquisition cost
• Bokfört värde (§7.3): book value — a fallback method used when nuanskaffningsvärde, normvärde, or ursprungligt anskaffningsvärde cannot be established (typically for acquired used assets lacking documentation), not an IT-specific rule
• Annat skäligt värde (§7.4): other reasonable value (requires justification)

For RP4, normvärden are the standard for all physical grid assets. IT systems forming part of the capital base (driftsystem, mätinsamlingssystem, mätvärdeshanteringssystem, avräkningssystem) are valued via §7.2 (nuanskaffningsvärde), not specifically at book value — an earlier version of this page had this backwards.

Reconciliation timeline

• 31 March 2023 (or Ei-specified date): initial submission of capital base + investment forecasts + running cost forecasts
• During 2024–2027: DSOs document actual investments and changes; no annual reporting to Ei
• 31 March 2028: post-period submission of actual outcomes; Ei reconciles against revenue cap
  • Investment/decommissioning actuals
  • Running cost actuals (including §9.5.8 flex costs at actual cost)
  • Revenue actuals vs. revenue cap: if actual revenue exceeds the cap by more than 5%, the excess above that threshold is subject to a surtax (överdebiteringstillägg) at reference rate + 15 pp; below the 5% threshold, only the excess itself reduces the next period’s cap, with no surtax — an earlier version of this page dropped the 5% threshold and implied any overdraft triggers the penalty rate

Regulatory context

EIFS 2023:4 and 2023:5 replaced earlier regulations following a court ruling by the Administrative Court of Appeal (KR’s dom) that invalidated parts of Ei’s earlier RP4 methodology. Version 2.0 of this handbook (September 2023) was a complete rewrite following that ruling. (An earlier version of this page claimed the applicable WACC for RP4 is documented in Ei’s “Bilaga 4/7” to the revenue cap decisions — no mention of “Bilaga 4,” “Bilaga 7,” “kalkylränta,” or “WACC” appears anywhere in this handbook, so that specific citation has been removed as unsupported.)

Relevance to wiki topics

• Ei: KENT system, reporting timeline, legal basis (EIFS 2023:4/5), capital base structure
• Flexibility Market: §9.5.8 is the direct regulatory mechanism for flex cost recovery; confirms the “1:1 cost coverage but no return” structure
• Why Swedish Local Flex Markets Are Thin — Structural Causes: §9.5.8 documents the specific provision that creates the asymmetry between CAPEX (earns return) and flex opex (recovered at cost only)
• Villkorade Avtal: §9.5.7 nätkapacitetsreserv shows how pre-market bilateral capacity purchases were handled before the flex framework existed
• Congestion Management: context for how DSO flex procurement costs sit in the regulatory framework