DSO Connection Queue Reform — The Swedish Policy Response

Sweden has a connection queue problem. It has a constellation of regulatory responses — some already in force, some proposed, some still being designed. The responses are coherent in direction but scattered across instruments, timelines, and actors. This synthesis maps what Sweden is actually doing about grid connection queues and asks whether the pieces add up to a solution.

The problem: three structural causes

The EU grid-connection guidance (C/2025/8473, December 2025) groups the root causes of connection queues into three areas, each with a Swedish counterpart:

1. Inadequate grid planning and development: construction of new infrastructure takes 4–10 years, against 2–3 years for demand or generation to connect. The guidance points to planning that does not sufficiently account for future demand, to alternatives to physical grid development not being considered, and to the usual reactive practice of investing largely in response to existing connection requests. A DSO that waits for formal applications before investing cannot meet a statutory two-year connection obligation as demand materializes.

2. Lack of transparency on available capacity and of locational signals: applicants often cannot see where a connection is feasible within the time they need, and incentives such as locationally differentiated charges, efficient use of allocated capacity and its reallocation back to the system are missing in most member states, so requests end up in congested areas. The guidance notes that implementation of the transparency requirement differs greatly across Europe. In Sweden this is the territory of how DSOs calculate capacity (Layer 1) and of the publication duty (Layer 4).

3. Grid connection procedures: speculative and non-maturing applications and organisational constraints (workforce, digitalisation) let projects that may never materialise reserve capacity — in Slovakia an estimated 50% of reserved capacity remains unused. First-come-first-served logic rewards early filing over project readiness. Sweden’s connection queue at Svk and regional DSO level has similar dynamics, particularly for large-scale production (wind, data centers).

Luftbokning is a separate, narrower Swedish framing rather than one of the EU’s three areas. In Ei R2024:14 the term is defined as large margins in grid planning caused by uncertainty about existing customers’ future transmission needs. After dialogue with Svk and the regional DSOs, Ei found no substantial potential to free grid capacity by changing the regulation of agreements or compensation, while assessing that it has sufficient mandate to prescribe more detailed requirements that could reduce luftbokningar provided the SOU 2023:64 proposals are implemented.

Layer 1 — Faktisk belastning and capacity calculation reform

Ei‘s position on how DSOs should calculate available capacity is the faktisk belastning doctrine, set out in Ei R2020:06 and reaffirmed in Ei R2024:14: on the basis of the förarbeten, Ei assessed that the calculation should start from the actual physical load, including sammanlagringseffekter (coincidence/diversity effects), and that contracted power (avtalad effekt) should not be the basis, since capacity can exist in the grid even where existing agreements suggest there is none.

R2024:14 adds three points:

• Since R2020:06, ellagen 4 kap. 2 § has been amended so that DSOs carry the burden of investigating whether flexibility resources or other measures can resolve a capacity shortage; a connection may be refused only if the shortage cannot be remedied in a socioeconomically justified way.
• Risk and sensitivity analyses should not take the sum of already-connected facilities’ contracted power as their starting point; forecasts should instead be built in dialogue with significant grid users, for example in connection with the nätutvecklingsplan.
• DSOs told Ei they calculate available capacity from actual load, but there were indications that some still deviate from the connection obligation when risk analyses show a risk of overload — something Ei may examine through tillsyn.

The report does not prescribe a specific smart-meter (AMI) methodology or a formal documentation requirement for the calculation.

What abonnerad effekt means: in Ei’s föreskrifter the term is used but not defined, and denotes only that the DSO has designed a power-based criterion for allocating fixed costs — it does not in itself allocate a specific network capacity to the customer, although some DSOs treat it as a booking of capacity (section 4.6.4). This separates the tariff question (how costs are allocated) from the planning question (how much capacity exists).

The contract-term problem: where a DSO has tied allocated network capacity to an abonnerad effekt in the nyttjandeavtal and the contract does not say how a later increase is handled, the customer can ask to raise it again and the DSO may be unable to reduce the allocated capacity so it can be freed for others. Ei suggests contract terms handling increases under the rules for new connections (4 kap. 15 § ellagen) and, as a more suitable alternative to allocating capacity through an abonnerad effekt, basing network analyses on actual load data and dialogue with significant grid users.

Layer 2 — Ei ställningstaganden on connection obligations

In 2025, Ei published four ställningstaganden (formal position statements) that collectively define a more demanding connection obligation than DSOs had previously faced. (Source - Ei Ställningstaganden Anslutningsprocessen (Ei2025-02 till 05))

Flexibility as prerequisite for connection delay (Ei2025:02)

The most significant enforcement signal: when a customer appeals to Ei that their connection time is unreasonably long (4 kap. 13 § ellagen), Ei will verify that the DSO investigated whether flexible resources could free up grid capacity before citing capacity shortage. This converts the flexibility assessment in 4 kap. 2 § ellagen from a consideration into an enforceable prerequisite. A DSO that delays a connection without demonstrating flexibility was assessed and found insufficient cannot rely on capacity shortage as a defence.

Ei also endorsed mognadsgrad (project maturity assessment) as a queue management tool — the methodology developed by Svk and Energiföretagen that grades applications by permitting, financing, and technical readiness. DSOs using mognadsgrad must ensure non-discrimination.

Additional positions: DSOs should disclose standardised connection routines for all installation types (not just production/storage as currently required by law); connection timelines should be provided for all facility types immediately.

Anticipatory investment as legal obligation (Ei2025:03)

Proactive grid building is not discretionary — it is required by the combination of:

• 3 kap. 1 § ellagen: operate the grid efficiently, safely, reliably
• 4 kap. 1 § ellagen: connection obligation
• 4 kap. 5 § ellagen: connection within two years maximum

A DSO that waits for formal applications before investing will systematically fail the two-year obligation as demand arrives. The DNDP is the legal vehicle for translating this obligation into concrete anticipatory investments.

Capital base conditionality and the safety valve: Anticipatory assets enter the capital base only when they enter service (Förordning 2018:1520). This creates tension: build early, but only recover costs when in service. The escape valve is 5 kap. 7 § ellagen — Ei may allow capital base inclusion before full utilization where circumstances justify. This is the cost-recovery safety net for genuinely proactive investments.

External financing of grid components (Ei2025:04)

No regulatory barrier prevents a connecting customer from financing, or pre-purchasing on behalf of, grid components needed for an extension — even before a connection agreement is signed. During long equipment lead times (transformers, switchgear: up to 2032 for some components per EU grids package data), customers can pre-order to shorten the build phase. Assets enter the capital base at commissioning with the correct rådighet indicator (Ägd/Hyrd/partial).

Referral rules (Ei2025:05)

Svenska kraftnät‘s transmission grid can become obligated to connect a customer who bypassed the regional grid entirely (4 kap. 1 § connection obligation). Svk cannot automatically redirect such applicants. Referral to a lower grid level is permitted (4 kap. 2 §) but requires special reasons (inefficiency, safety risk). Ei recommends — but cannot require — applicants to apply first to the lowest suitable level.

Layer 3 — Svk’s anvisningssystem proposal

In April 2026, Svenska kraftnät submitted a government assignment report proposing structural reforms to TSO-level connection allocation. (Source - Svk Anslutningsprocessen Rapport (2026))

Kapacitetszoner and intressentpooler — replacing queue logic

The core proposal: an anvisningssystem (allocation system) with kapacitetszoner (capacity zones) for specific customer categories, extending the existing offshore wind allocation model to land-based connections. A kapacitetszon defines:

• Reserved capacity around one or more connection points
• A kapacitetskarta showing available capacity at current, 5-year, and 10-year horizons
• Intressentpooler through which competing projects advance based on tillståndsmässig mognad (permitting maturity) — not arrival order

This directly implements the EU guidance’s “first-ready, first-served” recommendation. For categories where permits are insufficient as criteria (e.g., data centers), supplementary binding commitments serve as selection criteria. Svk explicitly rejects auctions — they would disadvantage smaller actors and create secondary capacity markets.

Locational signals: the anvisningssystem generates signals guiding specific customer categories toward connection points that are systemically beneficial — near generation surplus, where local flexibility can reduce transmission needs, or where combined solar+wind capacity is under-utilized due to over-reservation.

Coordination improvements

• Linked applications (matchning): production and consumption applicants filing jointly share capacity costs and reduce grid expansion needs. Svk will develop affärsmatchning principles
• Mandatory tripartite dialogue: Svk, regional grid company, and large customer must engage in three-way dialogue for major applications — clarifying prerequisites and alternatives before formal applications are submitted
• Ansökningsplattform: Svk reversed its 2024 opposition and will investigate a central platform for information exchange about connection queue applicants to facilitate matching
• Actual utilization profiles: Svk and regional DSOs are developing capacity allocation principles based on actual utilization profiles, not contracted maximum capacity — addressing over-reservation at TSO level, for example where combined solar and wind capacity is each reserved at its full peak

Fossil-free production requirements

Svk proposes investigating whether large-scale new electricity users should be required to contribute new fossil-free production as a connection condition (via PPA or equivalent). This is the most structurally ambitious element of the proposal and the one with the most unresolved legal and economic questions — Svk explicitly notes it has not completed feasibility analysis.

Layer 4 — EU regulatory instruments now entering Swedish law

Art. 6a — Flexible connection framework

Directive 2024/1711 made Art. 6a mandatory for all member states: DSOs may (and must have the framework to) offer flexible connection agreements in capacity-constrained areas, where customers accept curtailable connections in exchange for faster or cheaper access. Prop. 2025/26:16 (in force 1 January 2026) tasked Ei with developing the framework — certification criteria for effektregleringssystem, the FCA methodology, technical requirements. EU transposition deadline: 17 January 2025 (not 17 July 2026, which applies only to Art. 4/15a; corrected 2026-09-20). As of May 2026, no published framework.

Art. 6a is the regulatory mechanism that resolves the legal tension in Villkorade Avtal: under current law, conditional connections are a contractual workaround lacking clear statutory basis and with disputed scope. Art. 6a provides that foundation. Commission Recommendation C(2026)2850 further specifies that energy communities are eligible for Art. 6a flexible connections. (Source - Prop. 2025-26-16 Forbattrad utformning av EUs elmarknad (2025))

Art. 17 amendment proposal — mandatory FCA offer (new, European Grids Package; corrected)

CEER’s June 2026 paper (Source - CEER Grid Connection Challenges (2026)) reports a development not in the original December 2025 package summary: the permitting-acceleration Directive Proposal (COM(2025) 1007) component of the European Grids Package would replace Article 17 of RED III (Directive (EU) 2018/2001) — not Article 17 of the Electricity Directive as previously stated here — so that, within a prescribed deadline and where capacity is insufficient, the system operator shall propose an Art. 6a (Electricity Directive) flexible connection agreement where technically possible — tightening Art. 6a from an NRA-framework obligation into a near-mandatory per-application offer. If the applicant rejects the FCA, the SO may only propose an alternative connection point/date, or reject the request outright, and only on justified safety or technical-incompatibility grounds. Status: in co-legislator process (Parliament/Council) as of June 2026; no adoption timeline. If adopted, this would harden the “soft” framework obligation that currently leaves Swedish DSOs discretion over whether to propose villkorade avtal at all — directly relevant to the empirical finding below (Ei PM2026:05) that DSOs investigated zero flexibility alternatives before citing capacity shortage in regional/transmission connection delays.

Art. 18d — EU prioritisation proposal (COM(2026) 600, July 2026)

The Commission’s proposal to amend the Electricity Regulation (COM(2026) 600) would add Art. 18d: where grid capacity is scarce, regulators may approve measures that deter speculative connection requests, require project maturity and prioritise categories of user (public sector, social services, energy communities, households, SMEs, data centres, energy-intensive industry, transport) on objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria that may weigh congestion impact and economic, environmental and social benefits. Member States and regulators must also keep flexible connection agreements (Art. 6a of the Directive), non-wire solutions and cross-sectoral planning in place. The memorandum presents it as implementing the Commission’s connection-queue guidance and “further specifying” Art. 6 of the Directive, with the choice of measures left to the national regulator.

The EU DSO Entity asks for Art. 18d to be deleted: it overlaps Member States’ competence under Art. 6, several Member States are already legislating priority categories, and prioritisation carries political and distributional weight; the real fix, it argues, is investment ahead of demand (DSO Entity’s reaction). It is a proposal only, and the vault holds no source comparing Art. 18d’s categories with Svk’s anvisningssystem proposal (Layer 3).

Art. 31.3 — Quarterly capacity publication

Directive 2024/1711 also adds Art. 31.3: DSOs must publicly disclose available capacity for new connections within their area with high spatial resolution, updated at minimum quarterly. Disclosure must include: capacity under pending applications; and — critically — availability of flexible connections in congested areas. This makes Art. 6a flexible connection opportunities machine-readable and public. Connection applicants must receive progress updates within 3 months of application and quarterly thereafter.

This is the transparency layer that makes the capacity calculation reform (Layer 1) market-visible. Without publication, the outcome of a DSO’s capacity calculation is visible only to the DSO and to applicants who ask directly. With it, any applicant can see where flexible connections are available before filing.

Swedish implementation (2026): the capacity-information duty is already in Swedish law as 27 a § Förordning (2022:585) — publish on the DSO’s website, update at least quarterly, be transparent, clear and geographically detailed, and include the capacity subject to connection requests, the possibility of connection under a conditional (limit-and-control) agreement, and the basis for calculating available capacity. The same wording carries into elmarknadslagen (6 kap. 16 §) and elsystemförordningen (6 kap. 6–8 §§) from 1 January 2027. What remains open is whether further Ei föreskrifter or guidance are needed: in September 2026 Ei opened an early call for input (deadline 7 October 2026, ärende 2026–104346) on what information applicants need, how it should be presented (capacity maps are named as an example) and what level of detail is reasonable, with possible dialogue meetings in autumn 2026. (Source - Ei Inspel Tillgänglig Kapacitet (2026))

Empirical baseline — regional and transmission connection times (2023–2024)

Ei PM2026:05 (2026) provides the first systematic supervisory measurement of actual connection lead times at the regional and transmission grid level, covering 2023–2024 completed connections at six regional DSOs plus Svenska kraftnät.

Offer times far exceed two-year presumption

The time to issue a connection offer (from complete application) ranged from 406 days (Ellevio) to 1,620 days (Vattenfall Eldistribution, 130 kV) — all well above the two-year presumptive maximum of the connection obligation itself, let alone the time actually needed to complete the connection.

Completion times — 3 to 8+ years at scale

Share exceeding both legal limit and customer deadline

Svk’s transmission connections are the most severe: 60% exceeded both the two-year limit and the customer’s own requested timeline. For nätförstärkning connections at 400 kV, the average completion time approaches or exceeds a decade.

Why alternatives to grid reinforcement were not used

This is the most policy-relevant finding for the Layer 2 ställningstaganden framework. Ei asked each company what non-reinforcement alternatives had been investigated and implemented in cases where capacity constraints caused delays.

The answer across all seven companies: none.

The reported reasons:

• Three companies: facilities were physically too large to connect to existing grid, or no regional grid existed in the area — making market-based solutions (including flexible connections) physically inapplicable
• One company explicitly: the rules around Villkorade Avtal are perceived as unclear, so the company does not apply them to any significant extent
• One company (unnamed in the source): relied on reinforcement, citing unclear rules for villkorade avtal, and is developing flexibility markets and villkorade avtal as alternatives; noted customers show limited willingness to enter villkorade avtal due to curtailment risk
• A separate, also unnamed company: has developed its own flexibility markets to enable earlier connections pending reinforcement, and said permanent villkorade avtal have significant socioeconomic potential at regional level without requiring reinforcement
• One company: offers a villkorat avtal or customer-specific cost when a flexibility service meets reliability and availability requirements
• Four companies have no established methodology to evaluate costs and benefits of non-reinforcement alternatives

This directly validates the policy imperative behind Ei2025:02: requiring DSOs to demonstrate that flexibility alternatives were investigated is necessary precisely because they are currently not being investigated. The empirical record shows zero cases at regional/transmission level where alternatives were actually implemented.

Transparency gaps

Three of the seven companies publish no information about their current capacity situation. One was developing capacity publication tools with a planned Q1 2026 go-live. Ei concluded that this information gap affects not just individual customer planning but delivery security and electrification planning more broadly — reinforcing the Art. 31.3 quarterly publication requirement (Layer 4).

For outside context: the IEA’s September 2026 electrification report (IEA Special Report on Electrification) says delayed grid expansion means longer connection queues, more congestion and curtailment, that major grid projects take 5–13 years against under two for EV charging infrastructure, and that planning must look ahead instead of reacting to individual connection requests. It is a global source; it does not address Swedish queues.

Heavy-duty charging is one source of concentrated connection demand: an ICCT and Fraunhofer ISI model (ICCT and Fraunhofer ISI analysis) puts the top 10% of hexagons at 60–90% of national truck-charging energy across Europe and, in a Swedish case study with 20% of trucks electric, at about 70%, with local peaks of 20–50 MW in the largest freight countries. The authors recommend investing ahead of demand in identified hotspots because grid planning is reactive to customer demand. It is a projection for trucks over 12 tonnes, not measured Swedish load.

How the layers interact

Faktisk belastning (Layer 1) + Art. 31.3 / 27 a § (Layer 4) are two sides of capacity transparency: Layer 1 concerns how DSOs calculate available capacity; Layer 4 requires them to publish it, including the basis of calculation. Together they address the transparency gap the EU guidance names — applicants who cannot see where a connection is feasible file requests in congested areas.

Ei2025:02 (flexibility as prerequisite) + Ei2025:03 (anticipatory investment) + Ei R2024:14 (faktisk belastning) form Ei’s enforcement posture: a DSO facing a connection complaint must demonstrate it (a) calculated available capacity correctly, (b) investigated flexibility as an alternative, and (c) planned proactively rather than reacting to applications.

Svk’s anvisningssystem (Layer 3) + Ei2025:02 mognadsgrad + EU guidance first-ready-first-served converge on the same queue management principle from different levels: TSO-level capacity zones replace first-come-first-served; DSO-level maturity grading filters applications by readiness; EU guidance endorses both.

Art. 6a (Layer 4) + Art. 31.3 (Layer 4) + Svk locational signals (Layer 3) form the demand-steering toolkit: flexible connections in constrained areas provide a faster route for applicants willing to accept curtailability; public capacity maps make constrained vs. unconstrained areas visible; locational signals steer applicants toward areas with headroom.

International prioritisation frameworks (Energiforsk Kapacitet för tillväxt, 2026): two state-led models illustrate where Sweden’s queue reform could go. The UK “first ready and needed, first connected” clears immature projects and prioritises readiness plus alignment with national goals — going beyond Sweden’s readiness-only mognadsgrad by adding a need/benefit test. The Netherlands national prioritization framework departs from first-come-first-served for defined priority categories (actors that free capacity for others, safety-critical operations, basic societal functions) on objective regulator-defined criteria. Energiforsk’s key observation: effective prioritisation has required state-led frameworks, not decisions left to individual DSOs — and Sweden’s framework currently leaves system/societal prioritisation judgements explicitly out of scope. See Grid Capacity Utilization › Connection-queue reform as a capacity lever. (Source - Energiforsk 2026-1190 Kapacitet för Tillväxt (2026))

EU-wide allocation-procedure taxonomy (CEER, June 2026). CEER’s survey of NRAs/DSOs catalogues the full set of allocation procedures in use across Europe — first-come-first-served, first-ready-first-served, auction, repartition (pro-rata pooling), gradual/milestone-based, and priority lists — plus anti-hoarding measures (limited reservation deadlines, use-it-or-lose-it, security deposits, annual penalty fees, maturity assessments). Sweden’s emerging toolkit (mognadsgrad maturity grading, the anvisningssystem’s intressentpooler, and Svk’s explicit rejection of auctions as disadvantaging smaller actors) sits within this general taxonomy rather than inventing a distinct model — Svk’s repartition-like matchning (linked production/consumption applications) and gradual capacity release both have direct CEER-catalogued analogues. (Source - CEER Grid Connection Challenges (2026))

Nordic peer context (June 2026 joint TSO statement). A coordinated statement by the four Nordic TSOs confirms this is a shared Nordic (and European) problem: connection requests now exceed existing and planned capacity everywhere, a few very large projects dominate requested volume, and “first come, first served” is shifting to maturity-based allocation across the region. National responses rhyme with — and in places run ahead of — Sweden’s: Denmark (Energinet) reports requested capacity at ~8× total peak load, uses maturity requirements and early-phase payments, and openly calls for a political prioritization framework; Finland (Fingrid) is deploying flexible connection agreements and power-based tariffs and argues for making FCAs a permanent tool; Norway (Statnett) publishes its connection-request list and the Stortinget has amended the Energy Act to allow prioritization for national-security interests; Sweden (Svk) reaffirms the stepwise process and a capacity-zones pilot in the coming year. The throughline matches Sweden’s own gap (below): all four lean toward maturity/locational steering, but explicit societal prioritization needs political/legislative backing — which Norway has now legislated and Denmark is requesting. (Source - Nordic TSOs Grid Connection Requests Statement (2026))

What is not yet resolved

The reforms address the information and queue management dimensions of the connection problem. They do not resolve the physical constraint dimension: lead times for transformers and cables remain 2–4 years even when capacity is identified and applications are well-managed. The anvisningssystem’s capacity maps and maturity-based allocation can redirect demand toward available capacity, but cannot compress equipment lead times or accelerate permitting for new infrastructure.

Relationship to other wiki pages

• Distribution System Operator — detailed coverage of Ei ställningstaganden, faktisk belastning doctrine, Art. 31.3, and Art. 6a in DSO context
• Villkorade Avtal — Art. 6a is the statutory upgrade for conditional connections
• Anvisningssystem — primary concept page for Svk’s kapacitetszoner proposal
• Congestion Management — queue management and capacity allocation as congestion tools
• Distribution Network Development Plan — the DNDP as the planning vehicle for anticipatory investment (Ei2025:03)
• Flexibility Need Assessment — FNA and DNDP together define the grid-level demand for flexibility, which in turn determines where Art. 6a flexible connections are most needed
• Ei — ställningstaganden series; faktisk belastning doctrine; Art. 6a mandate
• Svenska kraftnät — anvisningssystem proposal; mandatory tripartite dialogue; referral rules
• Source - CEER Grid Connection Challenges (2026) — EU-wide allocation-procedure taxonomy; Art. 17 mandatory-FCA-offer amendment proposal; Spain/Finland FCA case studies