Ei R2024-14 Outnyttjad Kapacitet (2024)

Ei R2024:14 — Använda och fördela outnyttjad kapacitet i elnäten (Using and distributing unused capacity in electricity grids). Energimarknadsinspektionen (Ei) response to a Swedish government assignment (uppdrag). December 2024. The report investigates whether DSOs are systematically locking up phantom capacity through luftbokning (air booking) and what regulatory measures, if any, should be introduced.

Type: Government assignment report (uppdragsredovisning) — response to a government directive to investigate unused grid capacity. Language: Swedish.

Summary

The report’s headline conclusion is that DSOs already have the mandate to use and allocate unused grid capacity (“Elnätsföretagen har redan mandat att disponera outnyttjad nätkapacitet”), and that Svk and the regional DSOs confirmed there is no substantial potential to free capacity by changing the regulation of agreements or compensation. Ei sees further gains mainly from giving DSOs stronger incentives (through revenue-cap regulation and tariffs with locational signals), which requires changes to ellagen in line with the SOU 2023:64 proposals, and from the EU flexible-connection framework. The DSOs told Ei they already calculate available capacity from actual load (faktisk belastning); Ei nevertheless received indications that some deviate from the connection obligation when their risk analyses show an overload risk, and may examine this through supervision.

The report reaffirms the faktisk belastning doctrine, reviews the forthcoming EU framework for flexible connection agreements (Article 6a), and discusses total-cost revenue-framework incentives (without using the term “TOTEX”) as the long-term structural lever.

Core finding: luftbokning (air booking)

The report’s own glossary defines luftbokning narrowly: “stora marginaler vid nätplanering på grund av osäkerhet om de befintliga kundernas framtida överföringsbehov” — large margins in grid planning caused by uncertainty about existing customers’ future transmission needs, not (as the term might suggest) planning from contracted power as such.

The related — but distinct — issue the report spends most of its space on is DSOs conflating abonnerad effekt (subscribed/contracted power) with a right to physical grid capacity. Section 4.6.4 describes some DSOs tying allocated network capacity to a customer’s abonnerad effekt rather than the actual capacity used, then finding it hard to reclaim that capacity if the customer later asks to raise the subscribed level. Section 4.3 states DSOs should not base risk/sensitivity analyses on the sum of already-connected customers’ contracted (avtalad) power — forecasts should instead come from dialogue with significant grid users. Ei notes (section 4.2) it received indications that some DSOs still deviate from the connection obligation when their risk analyses show a risk of overload, even though they report calculating available capacity from actual load — something Ei may examine further through supervision (tillsyn).

The faktisk belastning principle

Faktisk belastning (actual physical load) is Ei’s established doctrine for how DSOs must calculate available capacity for new connection applications:

A DSO must calculate the available capacity on a grid segment using the actual physical load of existing customers, including statistical diversity effects — not the sum of their contracted power capacities.

This principle was first established in Ei’s report Kapacitetsutmaningen i elnäten (Ei R2020:06). R2024:14 reaffirms this doctrine and adds two developments since 2020:

1. Ellagen 4 kap. 2 § has since been amended so that DSOs now carry the burden of proof: a connection may only be refused if the capacity shortfall cannot be resolved in a way that is socioeconomically justified (samhällsekonomiskt motiverat) — as a rule of thumb, any flexibility resource cheaper per kWh than customers’ valuation of non-delivered energy should count as justified.
2. Ei plans to publish guidance during 2025 on how DSOs should carry out these socioeconomic assessments in practice.

The report does not describe a specific AMI/smart-meter-data methodology or a formal “diversity factor” documentation requirement — the operative change is legal (burden of proof) and the practical guidance is still forthcoming, not yet published as of the report’s December 2024 date.

Key legal clarification: Abonnerad effekt under EIFS 2022:1 is a cost-allocation criterion (how grid costs are divided among customers), not a right to specific physical grid capacity. A customer who has contracted 100 kW cannot legally claim that the DSO must reserve exactly 100 kW of grid capacity for them at all times. This distinction is critical for the DSO’s capacity calculation methodology.

DSOs cannot unilaterally revise contracts

One nuance the report carefully addresses: while DSOs must use faktisk belastning for capacity availability calculations (new connections, grid planning), they cannot unilaterally reduce a customer’s contracted capacity based on observed actual usage. The report does not describe a unilateral right for DSOs to lower a customer’s allocated capacity; where a nyttjandeavtal ties allocated capacity to an abonnerad effekt without saying how a later increase is handled, the DSO may be unable to release that capacity for others, and Ei suggests handling increases under the rules for new connections (4 kap. 15 § ellagen) or basing analyses on actual load data instead (section 4.6.4).

The implication is asymmetric: the DSO can say “we have room for a new 500 kW customer because your existing customers only use 60% of their contracted capacity in aggregate” — but cannot respond to the same observation by telling existing customers “we’re reducing your contracted capacity to your actual usage.”

Flexible connection agreements: Article 6a (EMDR 2024/1711)

The report gives significant attention to the new EU legal basis for flexible connection agreements:

Article 6a of Directive 2024/1711 (amending the Electricity Market Directive) requires Member States to establish a national framework for flexible connection agreements (FCAs) by a deadline that aligns with the NC DR implementing regulation (expected late 2025). Key requirements:

• Member States must allow DSOs to offer FCAs with defined power caps, curtailment rights, or conditional service terms
• NRAs (Ei in Sweden) must set the rules; DSOs cannot act without this framework
• The FCA framework must be non-discriminatory and transparent
• FCAs must be consistent with the NC DR framework for conditional connection agreements (villkorade avtal)

Status as of R2024:14: The Article 6a implementing regulation from the European Commission was not yet published as of December 2024. Ei was monitoring its development. The forthcoming NC DR T&C process will interact with the national FCA framework.

Implication for Sweden: Ei’s existing Villkorade Avtal framework (EIFS 2022:1, updated per Ei2025:01) is in substance compatible with Article 6a requirements. But it is currently an Ei ställningstagande (position statement), not a formal statutory framework. Article 6a will require transposition into Swedish electricity law (ellagen) or Ei regulations.

TOTEX as the structural lever

The report’s revenue-framework discussion (section 5.3.1) is the closest it comes to a TOTEX argument, though it never uses the word “TOTEX”: today’s efficiency requirement (effektiviseringskrav) applies only to ongoing controllable costs; extending it to total costs would strengthen DSOs’ incentive to choose alternatives to grid investment where those are more cost-effective over time. Ei states that making such changes to the revenue-cap regulation first requires legislative change along the lines proposed in SOU 2023:64 (the governmental inquiry into network tariff reform), and that its methodology work for the 2028–2031 supervisory period (RP5) — already underway — has this as a focus area.

Planned Ei actions (section 5.3)

The report proposes no regulatory changes as an outcome of the government assignment itself (5.3: “Ei föreslår inga regeländringar i samband med regeringsuppdraget”), but names four areas of ongoing/planned work:

1. Revenue-framework incentives for RP5 (2028–2031) — extending the efficiency requirement to total costs (not just controllable opex) and revising capital-base valuation to reflect actual acquisition costs; contingent on legislative change per SOU 2023:64
2. Locational signals (lokaliseringssignaler) in network tariffs — Ei reaffirms a proposal it first made in Ei PM2020:03; enabling this also depends on the SOU 2023:64 legislative process
3. Clarifying grid development plan (nätutvecklingsplan) requirements — following up on the first round of plans submitted end-2024 to see whether EIFS 2024:1 or its guidance need clarifying on how DSOs establish their “starting value” for capacity forecasts; Ei notes this action requires no new mandate
4. Continued supervision (tillsyn) — of tariff compliance ahead of the EIFS 2022:1 deadline (1 January 2027), of DSOs’ publication of available-capacity information under Article 57 of the revised Electricity Market Regulation, and of connection-within-reasonable-time obligations (local grid supervision started 2024; regional and transmission grid supervision planned for 2025)

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