Distribution System Operator
A distribution system operator (DSO; Swedish: distributionsnätsföretag) is the entity responsible for operating, maintaining, and developing the electricity distribution grid within a concession area. DSOs deliver electricity from the high-voltage transmission system to end consumers via medium-voltage and low-voltage networks. They are natural monopolies, regulated by a national authority — Ei in Sweden.
DSOs are the key actors for distribution-level Flexibility — they procure local flexibility services, maintain the grid connection infrastructure for distributed energy resources, and issue network development plans that quantify future capacity needs.
Core responsibilities
- Grid operation — maintaining safe, reliable supply within the concession area; monitoring voltage, managing faults, coordinating maintenance windows
- Connection — connecting new generation, consumption, and storage installations on objective, non-discriminatory, and reasonable terms (ellagen 4 kap. 1 §); includes issuing nätanslutningsavtal and potentially flexible connection agreements
- Power transfer — transporting electricity for others’ account through the distribution network (nätverksamhet), which requires a nätkoncession (grid licence) from Ei
- Metering — operating smart metering infrastructure; in Sweden, DSOs own and operate the meters at all delivery points
- Balance responsibility facilitation — DSO grids are the physical substrate for all BRP portfolio management; DSOs provide real-time and historical data to facilitate balancing
- Flexibility procurement — DSOs must assess whether flexibility services can substitute for or defer network investment (Directive Art. 32(1)); if market-based options are available and cost-effective, procurement is the default
- Network development planning — biennial DNDP obligation: develop, consult, publish, and submit to Ei every two years, covering planned investments and medium-to-long-term flexibility needs (Ellag 3 kap. 16 §; EIFS 2024:1)
- Data exchange — providing data on grid topology, capacity, and connection points to the national FIS (NC DR), other system operators, and regulators
EU regulatory framework
The Clean Energy Package defines the DSO’s role in detail:
- Directive Art. 32(1): DSOs must procure flexibility services through market-based procedures unless: (a) non-market tools are more cost-effective, or (b) markets are absent. NRA may grant derogation from the market-based default. This is the statutory foundation of EU DSO flexibility procurement obligations.
- Directive Art. 32(3): Biennial DNDP obligation — must include flexibility service needs and planned investments for the next 5–10 years.
- Directive Art. 32(4): DSOs must be neutral market facilitators — they cannot favour any particular technology or solution; they must enable equal participation by all market actors.
- Directive Art. 36: DSOs are prohibited from owning, developing, managing, or operating energy storage. Exceptions for fully integrated network components or where no third-party operator exists after a competitive tender (implemented in Sweden via ellagen 3 kap. 39–40 §§ and Förordning (2022:585) §§ 18–22).
- Regulation Art. 13: Redispatching (including DSO-level congestion management actions) must be market-based as far as possible.
- Network Code on Demand Response: Will formalize DSO obligations around local services markets, standardized product specifications, flexibility register participation, TSO-DSO coordination, and DNDP content.
Unbundling: DSOs with ≥100,000 customers must be legally and functionally separated from generation and retail activities (ellagen 3 kap. 21–29 §§). All DSOs must maintain accounting separation.
Neutral facilitator principle: A DSO must not use its position as grid operator to advantage particular market participants — it cannot condition grid access on using DSO-affiliated services, and must allow all qualified service providers to participate in local flexibility procurement on equal terms.
Swedish DSO landscape
Sweden has approximately 170 active DSOs (distributionsnätsföretag) — roughly 165 local DSOs (lokalnätsföretag) and 5 regional DSOs (regionnätsföretag) — holding a nätkoncession för område (area concession) or nätkoncession för linje (line concession). Based on Ei PM2025:03 (first-round DNDP synthesis):
| Category | Customers | Companies | Total customers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Small | <10,000 | 61 | 318,300 |
| Medium | 10,000–100,000 | 70 | 1,884,400 |
| Large | >100,000 | 6 | 3,432,500 |
| Production networks | — | 15 | 1,508 |
The six large DSOs account for the majority of Swedish customers. Four of these span multiple bidding areas and are tracked separately in Ei’s DNDP synthesis: Vattenfall Eldistribution, E.ON Energidistribution, Ellevio, and Skellefteå Kraft Elnät. Each serves hundreds of thousands of customers. The 61 small DSOs together serve fewer customers than a single large company.
Sweden’s distribution grid extends up to 220 kV — Swedish DSOs can hold regionnät (regional grid) licences at voltages that would be TSO-operated in other countries. The boundary with Svenska kraftnät‘s transmission system is not strictly voltage-defined.
Key Swedish DSO entities in the wiki: Vattenfall Eldistribution, E.ON Energidistribution, Ellevio, CoordiNet (demonstration), Effekthandel Väst (Göteborg Energi Elnät + Mölndal Energi Elnät).
Swedish regulatory framework
The Swedish regulatory chain governing DSOs:
Ellag (1997:857) — primary legislation
├─ 3 kap. 15–17 §§ — flexibility product obligations, DNDP, delegation to Ei
├─ 3 kap. 39–42 §§ — storage ban, demand flexibility prohibition
├─ 4 kap. 1 § — connection obligation (objective, non-discriminatory terms)
├─ 4 kap. 4a § — flexible connection framework (villkorade avtal)
├─ 4 kap. 46–47 §§ — Ei pre-approval of contract methods
└─ 5 kap. — revenue cap regulation (intäktsram)
└─ 5 kap. 12a § — revenue cap must consider flex service use
↓
Förordning (2022:585) om elnätsverksamhet
├─ §§ 10–12 — DSO flex product specifications + Ei approval
└─ §§ 13–15 — DNDP content + Ei prescribing authority
↓
EIFS 2024:1 — Ei's binding DNDP regulation
Revenue cap regulation (intäktsramsreglering): Ei regulates each DSO’s maximum revenue through four-year supervisory periods (tillsynsperioder). Current period: RP4 (2024–2027). The RP5 reform (2028–2031) will introduce TOTEX benchmarking — mandated by ellagen 5 kap. 12a § — which creates lösningsneutralitet (solution neutrality) between grid investment and flexibility procurement, removing the historical CAPEX bias. See Ei › CAPEX bias reform.
Product specifications: Under Förordning §§ 10–12, DSOs must develop product specifications for flexibility services they procure, submit them to Ei for approval, and publish approved products. Ei must approve if specifications ensure genuine, non-discriminatory participation by relevant market participants.
Förhandsprövning (proposed): In February 2026, Ei submitted a formal hemställan to the government to amend ellagen 4 kap. 46–47 §§ and add § 36a to Förordning (2022:585), introducing a statutory duty for Ei to pre-approve DSO tariff methods for connection and transfer charges before they enter into force. Sweden and Finland are currently the only two EU member states where the NRA neither decides nor pre-approves DSO tariff methods (ACER 2025 report); all other EU members have some form of ex-ante control. Sweden lost an EU infringement case in 2009 (C-274/08) and extended pre-approval to revenue caps (intäktsramar), but never to the underlying tariff methodologies. Under current law Ei can only correct tariff deficiencies going forward via tillsyn — not retroactively. About 30 DSOs have introduced effektavgifter with potential design deficiencies (timing windows, level-setting) that pre-approval would catch before customer impact. If the government adopts the proposal, implementation would be a two-step process: amend ellagen/Förordning (earliest in force 1 January 2027), then Ei develops the actual approval föreskrifter — estimated at 1–2 additional years. Actual pre-approval of DSO tariff methods would therefore not begin until 2028 at the earliest. Adoption by the government is still pending as of May 2026. (Source - Ei R2026-04 Förhandsprövning Avgifter (2026))
DSO and flexibility
DSO flexibility procurement is the central focus of the NC DR, the Flexibility Market, and Swedish regulatory reform. Key dynamics:
Art. 32 obligation: Since the Clean Energy Package entered force, Swedish DSOs have been obliged to consider flexibility services as alternatives to network investment. Implementation was initially uneven — most DSOs cited lack of local markets or suppliers, applying Art. 13(3) exceptions.
Market-based default: Ei has classified Villkorade Avtal as non-market-based redispatching, meaning they are a permitted exception to the market default rather than a compliant market-based tool. DSOs using only villkorade avtal must satisfy the Art. 13(3) conditions — primarily that no market-based alternative is available or cost-effective.
Tool mix (from Ei PM2025:03, first-round DNDPs):
- ~20% of DSOs currently use flexibility services — but representing ~70% of customers
- All 6 large DSOs use flex services; only ~10% of small DSOs do
- ~15% considering creating or participating in flexibility markets
- ~40% mention villkorade avtal or bilateral agreements
- 5 companies used omdirigering (redirection) in 2023
DNDP obligation: Since December 2024, all ~170 Swedish DSOs have submitted their first mandatory biennial DNDP under EIFS 2024:1. The plans must include: MW-quantified flexibility needs per delområde on a 5–10 year horizon (§ 4.12); adequacy assessment; and consultation results. Ei published a synthesis of the first round in Ei PM2025:03 (March 2025). (Source - Ei PM2025-03 DNDP Sammanställning (2025))
DNDP and self-consumption growth: Commission Recommendation C(2026)2850, Rec 11, specifies that DSOs must account for the expected growth and impact of self-consumption and energy community operations in their grid development plans, to allow for anticipatory investments. This extends the existing quantitative flexibility need obligation to explicitly include the self-consumption side — relevant for the next DNDP cycle (2027–2036). (Source - Commission Recommendation C(2026)2850 Energy Communities)
NC DR and Sweden’s multi-DSO challenge: The forthcoming Network Code on Demand Response will require DSOs to participate in developing national Terms & Conditions for flexibility markets, registers, and products. Sweden’s ~170 DSOs — predominantly small and medium-sized — present a design challenge for representative T&C development processes that Ei is actively working to address, with the process design due 12 months after NC DR entry into force. (Source - Ei NC DR Förberedelser (2025))
TSO-DSO planning cooperation structure: Svk’s Planering för ökad elanvändning (February 2025) documents the formal cooperation structure between Svenska kraftnät and the five major regional grid companies (regionnätsföretag): Vattenfall Eldistribution, Ellevio, E.ON Energidistribution, Jämtkraft Elnät, and Skellefteå Kraft Elnät. These are the only DSOs directly connected to the transmission grid and are therefore Svk’s primary DSO planning partners. Key forums:
- Nätplaneringsforum — annual strategic meeting for planning directors
- Systemforum TSO/DSO — started 2021 under the Electricity Market Regulation; handles strategic system responsibility questions; includes voltage/reactive power working group
- Nätägardialogen — Svk DG + DSO CEOs; drives the prognossamverkan initiative
- Prognossamverkan TSO/DSO — 6–8 meetings/year; joint demand forecasting with shared methods including AI-based dynamic load-type curves
Two identified improvement areas as of February 2025: (1) stronger forecast cooperation including shared scenarios and automated data exchange; (2) clarifying responsibility for capacity shortage, subtransmission, and flexibility — the last explicitly awaiting NC DR legislation before TSO/DSO responsibilities can be formalized. (Source - Svk Planering för ökad elanvändning (2025))
Svk anvisningssystem — coordination implications: Svenska kraftnät‘s April 2026 government assignment report (Dnr 2025/5008) proposes the Anvisningssystem, an allocation system for TSO-level connections using kapacitetszoner. DSOs (regional grid companies — regionnätsföretag) are central to the practical operation of this system: it is regional DSOs, not individual end customers, who apply to Svk for connection capacity. The report introduces:
- Linked applications: regional DSOs would facilitate and manage applications where production and consumption applicants want to file jointly (matchning), including transparency requirements on what profile criteria parties must meet
- Mandatory tripartite dialogue: Svk will introduce obligatory three-way dialogue between Svk, the regional grid company, and its large customer for major connection applications
- Standardized capacity principles: Svk and regional DSOs are developing principles for effective capacity allocation based on actual utilization profiles — relevant for both regional grid planning and connection queue management (Source - Svk Anslutningsprocessen Rapport (2026))
Capacity calculation doctrine: faktisk belastning
A significant source of phantom congestion in Sweden’s distribution grid is luftbokning (air booking): DSOs planning from contracted power (abonnerad effekt) rather than actual physical load (faktisk belastning), thereby locking up capacity that customers never use. A customer who contracts 100 kW but consistently draws only 60 kW ties up 40 kW as a phantom reservation.
Ei has established the faktisk belastning doctrine (reaffirmed in Ei R2024:14) that governs how DSOs must calculate available capacity for new connection applications:
A DSO must calculate available capacity on a grid segment using the actual physical load of existing customers, including statistical diversity effects (lastdiversifieringsfaktorer) — not the sum of their contracted power capacities.
Operationally: use AMI data (hourly smart meter data) to measure actual load; apply diversity factors (a group of customers never simultaneously reaches contracted maximums); update calculations periodically; document methodology for Ei oversight.
Key legal clarification: Abonnerad effekt under EIFS 2022:1 is a cost-allocation criterion — how grid costs are divided among customers — not a right to specific physical grid capacity. A customer who has contracted 100 kW cannot legally claim that the DSO must reserve exactly 100 kW of grid capacity for them at all times.
Asymmetric constraint: While DSOs must use faktisk belastning for capacity availability calculations (new connections, grid planning), they cannot unilaterally reduce a customer’s contracted capacity based on observed actual usage. Abonnerad effekt is a contractual right requiring customer consent or a tariff redesign process to change.
(Source - Ei R2024-14 Outnyttjad Kapacitet (2024)): Ei’s government assignment concludes that no new regulation is needed for capacity redistribution — the tools (faktisk belastning doctrine, forthcoming Article 6a FCA framework, TOTEX reform via RP5) are already in place or forthcoming.
Art. 31.3 — Quarterly capacity publication (Directive 2024/1711): Directive 2024/1711 adds Art. 31.3 to the revised EMD, requiring DSOs to publicly disclose available capacity for new connections within their area with high spatial resolution, updated at minimum quarterly. The disclosure must include: capacity currently under pending applications; and, critically, availability of flexible connections in congested areas — making the Art. 6a flexible connection opportunity machine-readable and public. Connection applicants must receive progress updates within 3 months of application and quarterly thereafter. DSOs with <100,000 connected customers may be exempt by national regulation. Implementing regulations had not been issued as of the Prop.’s September 2025 enactment; Ei is expected to issue föreskrifter. (Source - Promemoria Förbättrad utformning av EUs elmarknad (2025), Source - Prop. 2025-26-16 Forbattrad utformning av EUs elmarknad (2025))
Digital connecting SO (NC DR concept)
The DSO Entity report (2026) introduces the concept of a “digital connecting SO” — a new functional role for the entity responsible for the digital communication layer between controllable units (CUs) and the market, in cases where this differs from the physical grid operator. As aggregation, VPPs, and cross-DSO service provision become common, the entity operating the physical connection point may not be the same as the entity operating the digital communication and control interface. The DSO Entity argues that NC DR national terms and conditions must clarify which obligations (data provision, metering, settlement) attach to this role. (Source - DSO Entity Distributed Flexibility Practices (2026))
Relationship to other wiki concepts
- Transmission System Operator: the TSO operates the high-voltage transmission grid; DSOs connect to it via gränspunkter; TSO-DSO coordination is a central design problem in the Network Code on Demand Response
- Ei: regulatory authority; sets revenue caps, approves product specifications, receives DNDPs, supervises compliance, and will design the NC DR T&C process
- Distribution Network Development Plan: the DSO’s primary strategic planning document; biennial obligation under Ellag 3 kap. 16 §
- Flexibility Market: DSO-operated or DSO-facilitated markets for local congestion management
- Villkorade Avtal: conditional connection agreements; the most widely used DSO flexibility tool in Sweden
- Aggregation: DSOs interact with aggregators as service providers in local markets and as holders of connection points for pooled resources
- Network Code on Demand Response: the EU regulation that will most significantly reshape DSO obligations from 2026 onwards
- Natural Monopoly: the economic basis for DSO regulation and the neutral facilitator principle
EU DSO Entity
The EU DSO Entity (established under Directive 2019/944 Art. 52) is the EU-level representative body of DSOs, co-authoring network codes alongside ENTSO-E. As of 2024 it represents 830+ DSOs serving 250 million+ customers across 27 EU member states. (Source - EU DSO Entity Technical Vision (2024))
The Entity’s 2024 Technical Vision identifies four core development areas for DSOs:
| Area | Key theme |
|---|---|
| Planning & Investment | €55–67bn/year EU-wide investment; anticipatory investments; harmonized DNDP 10–20yr horizons |
| Market Facilitation | Flexibility harmonization (coordination, products, data, tarification, contracting); energy sharing enablement |
| Operations & Maintenance | Active system management; dynamic ratings; smart metering; digital twins |
| Resilience & Sustainability | Climate adaptation; cybersecurity (NC Cybersecurity three-tier framework) |
Digitalization underlies all four areas: the Technical Vision advocates for a Decentralized Data Space — interoperable, privacy-compliant data infrastructure managed by DSOs as primary data custodians for distribution-level customer and system data.
The Technical Vision concludes with a call to cooperation with ENTSO-E, the European Commission, ACER, and all network users — framing DSOs as co-architects of the energy transition, not just passive infrastructure operators.
AI-driven load forecasting — sector capability gap
The PREDATOR project (Energiforsk 2026:1168, Source - Energiforsk 2026-1168 AI-modeller Prognostisering Efterfrågan El (2026)) conducted four workshops with eight Swedish DSOs (Ellevio, Göteborg Energi, Mölndal Energi, Trollhättan Energi, Jönköping Energi, Umeå Energi, C+ Energi, Karlstads Kommun) between November 2023 and April 2024 to understand what data-driven demand forecasting tools they need and what they currently have.
Key finding: Many Swedish DSOs have no internal data-driven demand or load forecasting models at all. Planning relies on expert judgment, rule-of-thumb extrapolation, and the Energiforsk template tool (lathund). Even DSOs with some quantitative forecasting lack integrated end-to-end solutions that combine DER inventory identification, behavioral profiles, and growth scenario modeling.
What DSOs actually want: DSOs do not want partial tools or specialized components — they want complete, integrated end-to-end solutions that handle the full forecasting workflow. The organizational barrier (lacking internal staff combining domain knowledge with data science capability) is as significant as the technical barrier.
“Analyze-aggregate-extrapolate” framework: RISE Research Institutes of Sweden proposed a conceptual architecture for holistic DSO demand forecasting:
- Analyze — identify current DER inventory from AMI smart meter data, connection registers, and administrative data (EVs, solar, heat pumps, batteries per substation/feeder)
- Aggregate — build current-state load profiles per grid segment; validate against actual AMI measurements
- Extrapolate — project DER growth using sociodemographic and macroeconomic indicators (SCB, Eurobarometer, ESS, economic indicators)
Follow-up: a larger project DESGRID is planned to implement and validate this framework. Vinnova Advanced Digitalization funding application for an earlier version failed due to summer scheduling of the review committee.
This gap is directly documented by Energiforsk 2026:1157 (Source - Energiforsk 2026-1157 Nationell Metod Effekt och Kapacitetsprognoser (2026)) from a different angle: survey of 50 DSOs found 32% lack documented methodology, 40% lack documented power templates, and 36% do not validate systematically — with several noting their forecasts have systematically overestimated actual power needs.
DHV — centralization of DSO administrative tasks
The proposed centralt datahanteringsverktyg (DHV) will move several administrative tasks currently performed by individual DSOs to a central national function:
- Grid settlement (nätavräkning) — currently each DSO calculates and distributes settlement data to suppliers and BRPs; DHV will perform this centrally
- Data distribution — currently DSOs distribute metering data and delivery structure data bilaterally to suppliers, aggregators, and others; DHV becomes the single channel
- Delivery structure management — the mapping of customer↔supplier↔BRP↔meter point is maintained in DHV, not each DSO’s own system
DSOs retain responsibility for registering meter points, contracts, and meter values in DHV — they do not disappear from the data chain, but their administrative processing role is reduced.
For flexibility markets, the companion FIS (flexibilitetsinformationssystem) eliminates the need for each procuring DSO to build and maintain their own resource registration and settlement infrastructure — reducing the IT barrier particularly for small and medium DSOs.
Policy implication for the DSO role: The “neutral market facilitator” principle is strengthened by DHV — by removing bilateral data exchange, DSOs can no longer use information asymmetry (or the cost of obtaining information) as an implicit barrier to market participation. (Source - Ei Förslag Centralt Datahanteringsverktyg (2026))
Connection process — Ei ställningstaganden (Ei2025:02–05)
In 2025, Ei published four ställningstaganden clarifying DSO obligations in the connection process. (Source - Ei Ställningstaganden Anslutningsprocessen (Ei2025-02 till 05))
Flexibility as prerequisite for connection delay (Ei2025:02)
When a customer invokes 4 kap. 13 § ellagen to have Ei review an unreasonably long connection time, Ei will verify that the DSO investigated whether flexible resources could free up grid capacity to enable faster connection. This converts the flexibility assessment (4 kap. 2 § ellagen — flexibility and demand response as alternatives to reinforcement) into an enforceable prerequisite: DSOs cannot justify connection delays without demonstrating that flexible resources were considered and found insufficient. Citing prop. 2021/22:153, Ei notes that DSOs should generally not cite capacity shortage as grounds for refusal if the shortage can be addressed by flexibility without grid extension.
Ei also states that standardized connection routines should cover all installation types (not only production and storage facilities as currently required). DSOs are encouraged to implement and publicly disclose such routines immediately. Connection timelines (currently mandatory only for production installations under 4 kap. 8 § ellagen) should likewise be provided for all types.
Mognadsgrad: Ei endorses mognadsgrad (maturity grade, per Svk/Energiföretagen methodology) as a queue management tool, subject to non-discrimination requirements. Active dialogue with applicants — checking updated project status, revised capacity needs, and load profile matching for aggregation effects — is part of the connection obligation.
Anticipatory investment as legal obligation (Ei2025:03)
Proactive grid investment is not discretionary — it follows from the combination of 3 kap. 1 §, 4 kap. 1 §, and 4 kap. 5 § ellagen. A DSO that waits for formal applications before investing may fail to connect within the statutory two-year maximum as demand materializes. The DNDP is the vehicle for anticipatory planning.
Capital base conditionality: Assets built ahead of demand enter the capital base only when they enter service (används av nätkoncessionshavaren) under Förordning (2018:1520). 5 kap. 7 § ellagen provides a skälighetsbedömning escape valve: Ei may allow capital base inclusion before full utilization where circumstances justify — serving as the cost-recovery safety net for genuinely proactive investments.
External financing of grid components (Ei2025:04)
No regulatory barrier prevents a connecting customer from financing, or purchasing on behalf of, grid components needed for an extension — even before a connection agreement is signed. Practical matters (contractual structure, pricing) are for the parties to resolve.
At commissioning, externally financed assets enter the capital base under EIFS 2023:4 with a rådighet indicator:
- Ägd: DSO fully owns the asset → full capital base inclusion
- Hyrd: external party owns; DSO uses → entered as leased; running lease costs (excl. O&M) separately reported
- Partial: proportional owned/leased split
Only assets actually operated by the DSO during the supervisory period may appear in the capital base.
Referral to lower grid level (Ei2025:05)
A DSO or TSO may refer a connection application to a lower grid level under 4 kap. 2 § ellagen if there are special reasons (e.g., connection at higher voltage would cause inefficiency or safety risk under 3 kap. 1 §). But the reverse — requiring applicants to go to lower levels first — has no statutory basis. Under 4 kap. 3 § ellagen, only the local grid’s consent (not the regional grid’s) is required before applying to regional or transmission level.
Svenska kraftnät‘s transmission grid can therefore become obligated to connect a customer who skipped the regional grid entirely (4 kap. 1 § anslutningsplikt). Ei recommends — but cannot require — that applicants apply first to the lowest suitable voltage level and proceed upward in hierarchy. Concession assessment (nätkoncessionsprövning) and connection prövning are legally separate parallel processes.
EU grid connections guidance (C/2025/8473)
As part of the European Grids Package (December 2025), the Commission published non-binding guidance on efficient and timely grid connections (C/2025/8473). The guidance is directly relevant to DSO connection queue management.
Scale of the problem: At least 16 of 27 EU member states face grid connection queues as of mid-2025. In Slovakia, an estimated 50% of reserved grid capacity is blocked by speculative applications that never materialize.
Root causes
Three structural causes of connection queues, applicable across EU member states including Sweden:
- Inadequate grid planning — reactive rather than anticipatory; construction times (4–10 years) far exceed connection times (2–3 years); permit delays; equipment shortages (wait to 2032 for some items)
- Lack of transparency and locational signals — no visibility on where and when connections are feasible; absent incentives for locating in areas of available capacity; connection requests cluster in congested areas
- Connection procedure weaknesses — speculative applications blocking viable ones; ‘first-come first-served’ approach explicitly critiqued (does not reflect project readiness); only 11 EU member states have fully digitalised procedures
Key recommendations
| Recommendation | Description |
|---|---|
| First-ready, first-served | Replace first-come-first-served with readiness-based queue priority |
| Transparent maturity criteria | Published milestones projects must meet to maintain queue position |
| Milestone penalties | Projects failing milestones lose queue position; DSOs/TSOs must have mandate to clean queue |
| Queue monitoring | Regular, systematic removal of non-progressing applications |
| Locational signals | Differentiated connection charges or tariffs to steer connections toward areas of available capacity |
| Art. 6a flexible connections | Explicitly recommended for constrained areas: enables connection with conditional curtailment rather than refusal |
| Anticipatory planning | Grid development should anticipate future demand/supply, not wait for formal applications |
Swedish context: Sweden’s Ei2025:02 (Source - Ei Ställningstaganden Anslutningsprocessen (Ei2025-02 till 05)) and Svk’s Anvisningssystem proposal (mognadsgrad-based queue management, kapacitetszoner) are directly aligned with these EU recommendations — Sweden is working on the same problem set through its own regulatory channels. The ‘first-ready, first-served’ principle maps to Svk’s proposed maturity-based allocation under the Anvisningssystem. (Source - Svk Anslutningsprocessen Rapport (2026))
Grid utilization trends — Ei R2026:02
Ei‘s first biennial smart grid monitoring report (Ei R2026:02, December 2025) documents two utilization metrics across the Swedish DSO sector:
Utnyttjningsgrad (utilization rate = annual mean demand / mean of 4 highest peaks):
- Declining trend in regionnät 2021–2024 (each year lower than the previous)
- Lokalnät shows a smaller, less clear decline
- Ei explanation: increased variable solar/wind production raises injection (which counts as load in the denominator) without proportionally reducing winter demand peaks; slower-than-expected industrial electrification also holds down mean demand growth
- Increased flexibility services use could improve the indicator
Medellastfaktor (average load factor per day):
- Data 2016–2024; possible weak declining trend in recent years; harder to establish clearly
- Regionnät consistently lower than lokalnät
Both metrics indicate that the DSO grid is being used less uniformly over time — the ratio of peak capacity to average throughput is growing. This has investment implications: if capacity is sized for peaks that represent an increasingly small share of total energy throughput, the case for flexibility as an alternative to reinforcement strengthens.
(Source - Ei R2026-02 Utvecklingen av Smarta Elnät (2025))
Substation digitalization baseline — Ei SGI 2024
Ei’s SGI mandatory reporting (EIFS 2022:5) provides system-wide averages for the digitalization of lokalnät substations across 111 REL reporters in 2024:
| Indicator | System avg | What it measures |
|---|---|---|
| Sh_subs_measure1_REL | 35% | Substations with EIFS 2022:5-compliant hourly measurement (ch. 4 §2) |
| Sh_subs_automate1_REL | 1.1% | Substations with automated voltage regulation |
| Sh_subs_operable1_REL | 0.9% | Substations with voltage regulation operable from control center |
| Sh_subs_operable2_REL | 5.8% | Substations with switching equipment operable from control center |
| Sh_subs_automate2 | 0.2% | Substations with automatic resectioning (fault isolation) |
Only 35% of lokalnät substations have EIFS 2022:5-compliant hourly measurement. Automation and remote control rates are very low: under 6% for any form of remote operability, under 2% for automated control. This establishes the 2024 baseline — the Swedish distribution grid’s digital transformation remains in early stages for the majority of the network. (Source - Ei SGI Data 2023-2024)
Data gaps
- Revenue cap regulation details for individual Swedish DSOs
- How small DSOs (<10,000 customers) are handling DNDP compliance in practice — Ei’s tillsyn findings
- European DSO governance models studied by Ei for NC DR T&C process design (early 2026 study)
- Whether NC DR T&C process will give small DSOs meaningful representation vs being dominated by the six large companies