Flex›Source - Konkurrensverket Yttrande Ei R2021-03

Source - Konkurrensverket Yttrande Ei R2021-03

Konkurrensverkets yttrande avseende Ei R2021:03 (29 June 2021). Dnr 225/2021. Three-page consultation response from the Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket, KKV) to Ei’s report on independent aggregators. Signed by Director-General Rikard Jermsten; rapporteur Mark Bernard (ekonområd).

KKV’s statutory mission is to promote effective competition in both private and public markets. The response evaluates Ei R2021:03 from a competition policy perspective.

Summary

KKV is broadly supportive of the independent aggregation framework but raises two pointed concerns about design details that could undermine the reform’s pro-competitive intent.

Concern 1 — Cost-cap in the compensation model (Section 4.2)

Ei proposed that when an aggregator compensates a BRP for imbalances caused by activation, the compensation is capped at the BRP’s direkta kostnader (direct costs). The exact formulation: “Metoden för beräkning av ersättning ska få beakta de fördelar som aggregatorn har gett den balansansvariga, dock högst med det belopp som de direkta kostnaderna för den balansansvariga uppgår till.”

KKV argues this asymmetric design disadvantages aggregators:

  • Aggregator activations sometimes reduce BRP imbalance costs (e.g., if the BRP underestimated load and the aggregator’s downward flexibility closes the gap) — but the compensation model only flows aggregator → BRP, never in the reverse direction
  • The direct-cost cap means the entry barrier grows with the aggregator’s utility to the system: the more beneficial the aggregation, the larger the imbalance it may cause, and thus the larger the potential compensation obligation
  • KKV acknowledges the calculation of exact benefits is complex in a decentralized system with many interacting resources, so some simplification is unavoidable; but at minimum the cap should be better justified

KKV also notes that the reference offer model works as a floor for negotiation — aggregators and BRPs can negotiate more favourable bilateral terms — so the reference offer itself need not do all the work.

Concern 2 — Implicit subsidy from no meter data fees (Section 4.1)

Ei proposed that DSOs may not charge aggregators or suppliers for handling meter data at balanspunkter: “Nätkoncessionshavaren ska inte få ta ut någon avgift för hanteringen av de mätvärden från en balanspunkt som en elleverantör eller aggregator är skyldig att rapportera till nätkoncessionshavaren.”

KKV acknowledges Ei’s logic — (a) avoiding protracted disputes about what constitutes a reasonable charge, which would themselves become entry barriers; (b) the long-term expectation that a future elmarknadshubb absorbs these functions on commercial terms. But KKV notes:

  • In the short term, this rule implicitly subsidises aggregators relative to other metering users who pay their own costs
  • This could lead to överetablering (overestablishment) of aggregators
  • KKV flags this trade-off even while accepting the overall rationale

Key claims

  • The cost-cap creates an asymmetric entry barrier: its severity is proportional to how much net benefit the aggregator provides — structurally a “punishment for success” dynamic
  • Bilateral negotiation downstream of the reference offer is expected and desirable; the reference offer just sets the floor
  • The “no meter data fees” rule is an implicit subsidy that should be explicitly acknowledged as a policy choice
  • DSO cost recovery for meter data is a legitimate principle (each party bears its own costs); deviating from it requires strong justification

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