Source - SOU 2025-47 Elmarknadsutredningen (2025)
SOU 2025:47 “Spänning i tillvaron — hur säkrar vi vår framtida elförsörjning?” is the report of the Swedish Elmarknadsutredningen (Electricity Market Inquiry), chaired by Bo Diczfalusy and published in April 2025. It is the government committee report that preceded Source - Prop. 2025-26-240 Nya lagar om elsystemet (2026) and provides the substantive policy reasoning behind legislation enacted from 1 January 2027.
Source details
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | Statens offentliga utredningar (SOU) — government committee report |
| Number | SOU 2025:47 |
| Title | Spänning i tillvaron — hur säkrar vi vår framtida elförsörjning? |
| Committee | Elmarknadsutredningen |
| Chair | Bo Diczfalusy |
| Published | April 2025 |
| Pages | ~700 |
The title — “Tension in everyday life — how do we secure our future electricity supply?” — plays on “spänning” meaning both voltage and everyday tension.
Structure
| Chapter | Title |
|---|---|
| 1 | Författningsförslag (Legislative proposals — full text) |
| 2 | Inledning |
| 3 | Elsystemets förändring |
| 4 | Riskreducering och CfD |
| 5 | Systemansvar |
| 6 | Värdering av systemnyttor |
| 7 | Ansvar och roller avseende balansansvar |
| 8 | Anvisade elavtal och utsatta kunder |
| 9 | Förbättrad tillgång till data i elmarknaden |
| 10 | Vägen mot en trygg och konkurrenskraftig elförsörjning |
| 11 | Konsekvensanalys |
| 12 | Författningskommentar |
Key proposals
Terminology reform (Chapter 5)
Proposes replacing Swedish actor designations with EU-aligned terms throughout ellagen and associated ordinances:
| Current Swedish term | Proposed replacement | EU equivalent |
|---|---|---|
| Transmissionsnätsföretag | Systemansvarig för överföringssystem | TSO |
| Distributionsnätsföretag | Systemansvarig för distributionssystem | DSO |
| Nätföretag | Systemansvarig | System operator |
| Systemansvarig myndighet | (abolished) | — |
| Distribution av el | Transport av el | — |
“Systemansvarig myndighet” — currently Svenska kraftnät‘s role as a designated authority — is proposed for abolition; Svk’s TSO functions are instead grounded directly in the EU-law TSO role. Chapter 3 of ellagen is proposed to be renamed from “Nätföretag och drift av elnät” to “Systemansvar.”
The committee also proposes certifying Baltic Cable as a systemansvarig för överföringssystem for its HVDC link, requiring ownership separation between its transmission operations and commercial activities.
BSP/BRP role introduction (Chapter 7)
Proposes introducing two new definitions in ellagen, aligning Swedish law with EU regulation that has been directly applicable since before the SOU:
- Leverantör av balanstjänster (BSP): a market participant providing balance energy or balance capacity to TSOs
- Balansansvarig part (BRP): a market participant responsible for its own imbalances on the electricity market
The old “balansansvarig” role conflates both functions. From 1 May 2024, Svk operationally split the roles under EU regulation; ellagen has not been updated. The SOU proposes removing ellagen provisions that duplicate directly applicable EU law, replacing them with references to EU regulations (2019/943 and 2017/2195).
Critical constraint: Despite the legal separation, Svk assessed that full BSP functionality — a BSP bidding to Svk without being the BRP for that delivery point — cannot be technically implemented until 2028. Until then, a BSP must also be the BRP for every delivery point it bids from. This is the structural barrier limiting independent aggregators.
The committee explicitly does not propose changes to the “leverantör av aggregeringstjänster” (aggregation service provider) role; Svk’s FSP (Flexibility Service Provider) model and compensation mechanism proposal is still being processed in Regeringskansliet.
15-minute settlement: The mFRR Energy Activation Market (mFRR EAM) was launched in March 2025, completing the shift to 15-minute imbalance settlement. All BRP plans now cover 15-minute intervals, updated up to 45 minutes before the delivery quarter.
Capacity mechanisms (Chapter 6)
Assessment: A strategic reserve is adequate for ensuring resource adequacy over the next 10 years. A market-wide capacity mechanism (as proposed by Svk) is not justified because benefits do not outweigh costs.
- Sweden’s reliability norm: 1 hour/year (among Europe’s most stringent)
- VOLL set by Ei at 7,065 EUR/MWh (December 2023)
- Svk should continuously evaluate whether a capacity mechanism is needed; EU approval is capped at 10 years
- A market-wide mechanism should not be introduced without broad Nordic coordination given cross-border spillover effects
Flexibility for grid congestion (Chapter 6.7)
Nodal pricing: Analyzed as the theoretical benchmark for correct flexibility valuation. Rejected as a direct implementation because of: liquidity fragmentation, market power risk, investment uncertainty, and administrative complexity. The committee recommends using it only as a reference standard — flow-based capacity calculation (active in Norden since October 2024) can partially serve this role.
Network tariff reform:
- Proposal: Government gives Ei mandate to require DSOs to report tariff and transport conditions to Ei
- Ei should evaluate how price signals pass between network levels; current EIFS 2022:1 four-component structure (fixed / energy / customer-specific / capacity fee) is a good first step but has weaknesses
- Energy fee: Ei should require transparent formula-based calculation (loss coefficient + day-ahead price + trading premium); unlocks third-party optimization services
- Capacity fee issues: overly broad high-load periods (e.g., Ellevio defines 16 of 24 hours/day as peak) reduce precision and may deter battery/EV participation on balancing markets
- Location signals: Ei started work on localization signals (March 2025); existing §§31–32 4 kap. ellagen allow limited-duration location-specific tariffs; only ~8 applications since 2019
Redispatching/omdirigering:
- Only 5 DSOs + Svk reported using redispatch in 2023 (out of ~170 DSOs)
- Volumes: Svk 0.087 TWh + other DSOs 0.063 TWh = 0.09% of total production
- Structural risk: repeated predictable redispatch creates perverse localization incentives (“increase-decrease game”) — actors may deliberately site in congested areas
- Non-market-based redispatch with cost-based compensation (Germany, Norway since 2002) is permitted under Art. 13.3 EMR in specific situations
Villkorade avtal reform:
- Proposal: Ei should investigate (a) fee structure, (b) whether permanent conditional agreements should be allowed (as in Netherlands, Denmark, Norway), (c) whether existing customers can get them, and (d) whether villkorade avtal should cascade between network levels
- Permanent agreements give a reduced capacity fee — directly increasing incentives for EVs and batteries to also participate on balancing markets
- Cascading: ensures congestion arising in the transmission network can be managed using villkorade avtal in underlying distribution networks
Default supply reform (Chapter 8)
Proposes abolishing anvisade elavtal (directed supply contracts):
- Replace with sistahandsleverantör (last-resort supplier): each DSO designates one; must supply customers with expected consumption <100,000 kWh/year
- Customers must still sign a contract; vulnerable customers get variable-price offers with 14-day notice period
- Suppliers must notify DSOs when terminating customer contracts
Data marketplace (Chapter 9)
Government should commission Ei (with Svk, Energimyndigheten, IMY, MSB) to develop a secure data tool for the electricity market — to promote flexibility, simplify processes, and provide better regulatory statistics. The mandate should cover required functionality, cost and timeline, ownership/governance/financing, and legislative proposals.
CfDs and financial market (Chapter 4)
Proposes two-way CfDs (dubbelriktade differenskontrakt) as state risk-sharing for new offshore wind investments. State risk-sharing is justified for assets providing unpriced system benefits (inertia, offshore transmission corridor value). Energy-only market remains the primary resource adequacy mechanism.
Key assessments (not proposals)
- Nodal pricing: not a realistic near-term implementation; use as theoretical benchmark only
- Full BSP implementation: 2028 at the earliest; structural barrier to independent aggregation persists until then
- Aggregation compensation mechanism: Svk’s FSP/compensation model still in Regeringskansliet; not covered by this SOU
- The EB GL deadline for a free-standing BSP was December 2020; Sweden’s 2028 implementation date is approximately 8 years late
Relation to subsequent legislation
SOU 2025:47 preceded Source - Prop. 2025-26-240 Nya lagar om elsystemet (2026) (April 2026, in force 1 January 2027). The bill enacted many SOU proposals, including the BSP/BRP role introduction and sistahandsleverantör. For legislative text, see the bill; for policy reasoning, see this SOU.
Relevance to wiki pages
- Aggregation — BSP/BRP 2028 timeline; FSP concept; EB GL breach duration
- Balancing Markets — BSP/BRP legal introduction; March 2025 mFRR EAM launch
- Villkorade Avtal — permanent agreements, cascading, existing customers
- Congestion Management — nodal pricing analysis; redispatch volumes; tariff reform
- Svenska kraftnät — systemansvarig myndighet role abolished; Baltic Cable certification
- Transmission System Operator — terminology alignment
- Distribution System Operator — terminology alignment
- Nordic Balancing Model — 15-minute settlement completion March 2025