Source - Electricity Market Design Reform Directive (EU 2024/1711)

Directive (EU) 2024/1711 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design. In force 16 July 2024. Requires transposition into national law; general deadline 17 January 2025. Art. 2(2) and Art. 2(5) — covering flexible connection agreements (Art. 6a) and energy sharing (Art. 15a) — have a later transposition deadline of 17 July 2026.

Document metadata

Title: Directive (EU) 2024/1711 (Electricity Market Design Reform — Directive)
OJ reference: OJ L, 2024/1711, 26.6.2024
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1711/oj
In force: 16 July 2024
Transposition deadline: 17 January 2025 (general); 17 July 2026 (flexible connections, energy sharing)
Raw file: Raw/Clippings/Directive - EU - 20241711 - EN.md
Part of: Electricity Market Design Reform 2024

Context

Adopted together with Regulation 2024/1747 as the EU’s response to the 2021–2022 energy price crisis. The Directive amends Directive 2019/944 (the primary electricity market directive for consumers and DSOs) and Directive 2018/2001 (the Renewable Energy Directive). The Commission proposal was presented in March 2023; provisional agreement reached December 2023; adoption May 2024.

New definitions added to Directive 2019/944 (Art. 2)

Term	Definition
Active customer (amended Art. 2(8))	Extended to include “shared electricity within other premises” — explicitly covers energy sharing participants
Energy sharing (new Art. 2(10a))	“The self-consumption by active customers of renewable energy either (a) generated or stored offsite or on sites between them by a facility they own, lease or rent; or (b) the right to which has been transferred to them by another active customer”
Fixed-term, fixed-price electricity supply contract (new Art. 2(15a))	A supply contract where price and terms are guaranteed for the duration; may include peak/off-peak variations but changes only from taxes and levies, not supplier pricing
Flexible connection agreement (new Art. 2(24c))	“A set of agreed conditions for connecting electrical capacity to the grid that includes conditions to limit and control the electricity injection to and withdrawal from the transmission network or distribution network” — the EU-level legal definition of what Sweden calls villkorade avtal
Energy poverty (new Art. 2(24b))	Cross-references Directive (EU) 2023/1791 (Energy Efficiency Directive)

Article 6a — Flexible connection agreements (the EU legal basis for villkorade avtal)

This article creates the EU-level mandatory framework for flexible connection agreements (FCA). Key requirements:

Mandatory framework: Regulatory authorities (or another designated authority) must develop a framework for TSOs and DSOs to offer FCAs in areas where there is limited or no network capacity for new connections
Framework requirements:
- (a) FCAs must not as a general rule delay network reinforcements in the identified areas
- (b) Conversion from flexible to firm connection must be ensured based on established criteria once the network is developed
- (c) Where network development is not the most efficient solution, flexible connections may be a permanent solution, including for energy storage
Content of FCAs (optional but permitted):
- Maximum firm and flexible injection/withdrawal capacities, differentiated by time block
- Network charges for both firm and flexible capacities
- Duration and expected date for granting full firm capacity
Technical requirement: System users connecting via flexible connection must install a power control system certified by an authorised certifier
Transposition deadline: 17 July 2026

This article is the EU-level legal basis for Villkorade Avtal and the pending Swedish national framework. It was anticipated in Ei R2024:14, which noted that Sweden’s existing framework is in substance compatible but requires formal transposition.

This new article establishes a right to energy sharing for households, SMEs, public bodies, and (optionally) other categories of final customer:

Eligible participants: households, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), public bodies; member states may extend to other categories
Geographic scope: within the same bidding zone or a more limited geographical area defined by the member state
Capacity limit: facilities up to 6 MW capacity; larger customers (above SME threshold) must operate within a local/limited geographical area
Third-party organiser: active customers may appoint an organiser to manage communication with system operators, billing, metering, and operation — the organiser may own/manage up to 6 MW without being considered an active customer
Settlement: shared electricity deducted from total metered consumption within an interval no longer than the imbalance settlement period
Household exemptions: households with ≤10.8 kW (single) or ≤50 kW (multi-apartment) are not required to comply with supplier obligations; member states may raise to 30 kW (single) or 40–100 kW (multi-apartment)
Compatibility with demand response: fixed-price contract holders must not be prevented from participating in demand response and energy sharing (Art. 11(1b))
Vulnerable consumers: member states must take measures for vulnerable customers and energy-poor customers to access energy sharing; public energy sharing projects should make at least 10% accessible to vulnerable customers
Transposition deadline: 17 July 2026

Article 4 — Multiple metering points

Member states must ensure customers can have more than one electricity supply contract or energy sharing agreement at the same time, with more than one metering and billing point covered by a single connection point. This enables separate contracts for heat pumps, EV chargers, or other flexible loads — a key enabler for granular demand response.

Article 31 — DSO capacity publication obligations (amended)

DSOs must publish available capacity for new connections with high spatial granularity, including capacity under connection request and flexible connection possibility in congested areas — at least quarterly
DSOs must provide information on connection request status within 3 months of submission; updates at least quarterly
DSOs must offer digital-only grid connection requests (new Art. 31(3a))
Threshold: member states may exempt DSOs with fewer than 100,000 customers; those DSOs are encouraged to publish information at least annually

Article 11 (amended) — Fixed-price contracts and dynamic pricing

All final customers with smart meters must be able to request dynamic electricity price contracts
All final customers can request fixed-term, fixed-price contracts of at least one year from any supplier with >200,000 customers
Suppliers may not unilaterally modify terms of fixed-price contracts or terminate before maturity
New Art. 11(1b): fixed-price contract holders must not be excluded from participating in demand response and energy sharing, and must be able to contribute to national electricity system flexibility needs

Consumer protection provisions

Article 18a — Supplier risk management

Regulatory authorities must ensure suppliers have appropriate hedging strategies for their fixed-price contracts. Strategies may include PPAs or forward contracts. Member states may require that a share of supplier hedging uses PPAs for renewable energy.

Article 27a — Supplier of last resort

Member states must have a supplier-of-last-resort regime ensuring continuity of supply for household customers. Customers transferred to supplier of last resort retain all consumer rights.

Article 28a — Protection from disconnections

Vulnerable customers and energy-poor customers must be fully protected from electricity disconnections. Suppliers cannot disconnect on grounds under dispute or subject to complaint procedures.

Article 66a — Access to affordable energy during electricity price crisis

A new provision allowing the Council (acting on Commission proposal) to declare a regional or Union-wide electricity price crisis when:

Wholesale prices ≥2.5× five-year average AND ≥180 EUR/MWh, expected to last ≥6 months; AND
Retail price increases ≥70%, expected to last ≥3 months

During a crisis declaration, member states may temporarily apply regulated prices to SMEs (up to 70% of previous-year consumption) and, below-cost pricing with supplier compensation (up to 80% of household median consumption).

Amendment to Directive 2018/2001 (Renewable Energy Directive)

Article 1 of the amending Directive removes the obligation for direct price support for renewables to use market premiums for those technologies subject to mandatory two-way CfDs under Art. 19d(1) of Regulation 2019/943 — allowing CfD revenues to be redesigned without conflict with the RED II market premium requirement.

Baltic states and Cyprus derogations

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are granted derogations from balancing market requirements (Art. 40(4) and Art. 54(2)) for up to 3 years after synchronisation with Continental Europe (extendable by 5 years). Cyprus is granted a permanent derogation until interconnection with other member states. Reason: these systems cannot yet develop functioning balancing markets due to current dependency on other synchronous areas.

Relevance to wiki topics

Villkorade Avtal: Art. 6a is the primary EU-level legal mandate for flexible connection agreement frameworks; Sweden must transpose by 17 July 2026
Flexibility Need Assessment: Art. 31(3) DSO capacity publication (at least quarterly, spatially granular) is the companion obligation to Art. 19e of Regulation 2024/1747 (FNA requirement)
Demand Response: Art. 11(1b) ensures fixed-price customers can participate; Art. 4 multiple metering points enables granular demand response
Power Purchase Agreement: Art. 18a allows/may require supplier hedging through PPAs; establishes PPAs as risk management instruments for fixed-price contracts
Electricity Market Design Reform 2024: this directive is one half of the reform package
Clean Energy Package: this Directive amends the CEP’s core consumer/DSO instruments (2019/944 and 2018/2001)
Balancing Markets: Baltic derogations reflect that not all EU systems are ready for full balancing market liberalisation