COM(2026)600 Future-Proofing Electricity Bills (2026)
Source details
- Type
- Regulation
- Publisher
- European Commission
- Published
- 2026-07-17
- Link
- data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12071-2026-INIT/en/pdf
Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/943 “as regards future-proofing electricity bills in the Union, through reducing system costs and fostering electrification and digitalisation”, COM(2026) 600 final, 2026/0203 (COD), Brussels, 17 July 2026 (Council doc 12071/26). Legislative proposal, not yet adopted; the co-legislators (Parliament and Council) have not acted in any source held here. Legal basis Art. 194(2) TFEU; the taxation measures are described as ancillary to that basis.
It replaces Art. 18 of the Electricity Regulation and adds Arts. 18a–18d, with empowerments in Art. 61. It follows the Commission’s non-binding network-charges guidelines and turns part of them into law, and it is the legislative companion to the European Grids Package. The industry response of DSO Entity is a separate source.
Why now — the memorandum’s framing
- Response to the March 2026 European Council request for measures on all components of electricity prices and to the Commission’s AccelerateEU Communication (COM/2026/370), which announced a proposal on network charges and taxation. Background given is the Middle East conflict and higher fossil-fuel costs (a stated 500 million EUR/day extra cost).
- No impact assessment and no dedicated stakeholder consultation: the Commissioner for better regulation granted a derogation because of the compressed timeframe; a staff working document accompanies the proposal instead.
- Network charges were on average 24–29% of the household electricity bill in recent years; ACER estimates grid investment must double or triple past annual rates, and grid costs could rise by up to 60% by 2050 against 2022.
- Grid connection queues exist in at least 16 Member States (Fraunhofer et al., September 2025, the EC study). Smart-meter penetration was about 60% in 2024, with fifteen Member States above 80%.
Art. 18 — network charges (replaced)
| Para. | Content |
|---|---|
| 1 | Charges must be cost-reflective, transparent and non-discriminatory, give system operators incentives to develop and run networks cost-efficiently, and give users incentives to adjust their use of the system |
| 2 | ”Tariff methodologies” cover both the design of charges and the remuneration of operators. Criteria (a)–(n): costs of an efficient, structurally comparable operator, including anticipatory investment, capex and opex; common performance indicators including smart grid indicators; incentives for optimising existing grids through flexibility services, non-wire and digital solutions, smart grids and smart metering; cost-reflective charges for withdrawal and injection; locational investment signals; peak-load incentives including a capacity element (g); time-of-use elements (h); no discrimination between DSO- and TSO-connected users; no disincentive to third-party access, aggregation, energy communities, self-consumption, storage or demand response (j); enable renewables via non-fossil flexibility (k); enable flexible connections (l); storage charges limited to the costs storage creates and reflecting benefits (n) |
| 3 | Special tariff regimes for categories such as energy-intensive industries, data centres and energy communities, if the regulator shows a proportionally lower or higher network cost impact and cost-reflectivity holds |
| 4 | Member States may partly cover network costs from State funds, if non-discriminatory, not undermining incentives, temporary and limited to the extra costs of decarbonisation, electrification and market integration |
| 5 | From entry into force plus 13 months, regulators publish (or require publication of) cost data (transmission and distribution capex, opex, losses, metering, reactive power, ancillary and congestion-management purchases), the assessment behind tariff methodologies, cost categories per tariff, tariff values per user group, studies relied on, special regimes and performance indicators, in an open downloadable format |
| 6 | Public consultation before a tariff methodology is fixed or approved |
| 7 | ACER assists in setting indicators and compares TSO efficiency (report at entry into force plus 25 months, then every four years). Regulators compare DSOs in their jurisdiction “insofar as there is more than one” DSO and “taking into account national specificities” (report at plus 37 months, then every four years) |
| 8–9 | ACER best-practice report on tariff methodologies (plus 25 months, updated at least every two years); regulators must take it “duly” into consideration |
Arts. 18a–18d (inserted)
- Art. 18a — smart grid indicators and innovation. Regulators promote non-wire, smart and digital solutions through Art. 18 incentives and by “considering those solutions with priority” under network development plans (Arts. 32 and 51 of Directive 2019/944, that is, the DNDPs). ACER, with the Commission, ENTSO-E, the EU DSO Entity and stakeholders, issues a recommendation on smart electricity grid indicators within 12 months of entry into force; TSOs and DSOs supply the data to regulators and ACER; ACER reports at least every three years. TSOs and DSOs must manage and exchange grid data “in a harmonised manner” in compliance with Chapter III of the Data Act, and within 12 months ENTSO-E and the EU DSO Entity must jointly facilitate a voluntary secure grid data exchange framework for research and innovation reuse; the Commission gives an opinion within six months. Participants must comply with later implementing acts (Art. 61(5b)), without affecting voluntariness.
- Art. 18b — smart metering. Member States must reach smart metering systems for 50% of final customers by 31 December 2030 and 75% by 31 December 2033; Member States under 30% at entry into force get 2031 and 2034. Cost-benefit assessments under Directive 2019/944 then apply only beyond 75%.
- Art. 18c — electricity taxation. Member States must promote electricity uptake through a supportive tax framework and apply a differential on excise duties (Directive 2003/96/EC) so that electricity is not taxed at a higher rate than natural gas; the Commission may authorise a deferral by implementing act on a justified request. Electricity for energy-intensive businesses (Art. 17(1)(a) of that Directive) is deemed to meet the requirements in Art. 17(4).
- Art. 18d — grid connection measures in case of congestion. Where capacity is scarce, regulators may approve measures to deter speculative connection requests, require project maturity and prioritise categories of user (public sector, social services, energy communities, households, SMEs, data centres, energy-intensive industry, transport) with objective, transparent, non-discriminatory criteria that may weigh congestion impact and economic, environmental and social benefits. Member States and regulators must also keep non-wire solutions (Art. 18a), flexible connection agreements (Art. 6a of Directive 2019/944) and cross-sectoral network planning in place. The memorandum presents this as implementing the Commission’s connection-queue guidance (C/2025/6703) and “further specifying” Art. 6 of the Directive, leaving choice of measures to the national regulator.
Art. 61 — empowerments
- 61(5a) delegated act on “guidelines on a common structure and harmonised methodology on tariffs” under Art. 18, after an ACER recommendation, covering harmonised tariff structures, the conditions for separate charge regimes under Art. 18(3) and consultation requirements under Art. 18(6). The memorandum says operational changes need “tertiary legislation” like the gas sector’s. The same paragraph empowers implementing acts on smart grid indicators.
- 61(5b) implementing acts on data models, formats, ontologies, interfaces, secure processing environments and cybersecurity for the Art. 18a(5) data framework.
Relevance to existing wiki topics
- Sweden and tariffs: Art. 18(2)(g)–(h) (capacity and time-of-use elements) is what Sweden’s effektavgift redesign already does; Art. 18(2)(a),(c) anticipatory investment and optimisation incentives parallel the TOTEX reform in RP5 Revenue Cap Methodology (2028–2031), which also already benchmarks DSOs (DEA), so Art. 18(7) mostly formalises existing practice, though its four-year cycle and reporting are new.
- Connections: Art. 18d and the retained Art. 6a reference bear on the Swedish queue-reform layers and Flexible Connection Agreements.
- Data: Art. 18a(4)–(5) and 61(5b) sit next to the interoperability work behind Network Code on Demand Response and the wider Digitalization and Smart Grid agenda; Art. 18a indicators sit next to CEER’s indicators and Ei R2026:02.
- Smart meters: Sweden reports 100% smart-meter rollout (Source - ACER Retail Energy Markets Dashboard Sweden (2025)), so Art. 18b matters mainly as precedent; see Submetering.
- Taxation: Art. 18c would require Sweden to check its electricity versus natural-gas excise differential; the vault holds no source on that comparison.
Not covered by this source
The staff working document (Council ADD 1) and the legislative financial statement’s resourcing detail beyond the articles were not summarised here. The vault holds no source on the Commission’s press material or on Parliament and Council positions.
Cited by 14
- C(2026)126 Future Proof Network Charges Guidelines
- Data Centres
- Digitalization and Smart Grid
- Distribution System Operator
- DSO Connection Queue Reform
- DSO Entity Reaction to Future-Proofing Electricity Bills (2026)
- DSO Tariff Reform
- Electricity Market Design Reform 2024
- Flexible Connection Agreements
- ICCT Spatiotemporal Analysis of Electric Truck Charging Demand in Europe (2026)
- IEA Special Report on Electrification (2026)
- ISGAN BRIDGE Distribution Remuneration and Flexibility (2026)
- Network Code on Demand Response
- Submetering