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Konkurrensverket

Entity Updated 2026-09-23

This isn't Konkurrensverket's first time making this argument — it issued yttranden in 2017, 2020, and 2023 all previously arguing Swedish revenue caps are too generous, so the 2026 report is the fourth iteration of a position the authority has held for nearly a decade, not a new finding.

Energiföretagen Sverige publicly disputed the 2026 report's reasoning — the industry's own trade association argues pricing that stays within ellagen's revenue-cap limits shouldn't separately count as "unreasonable" under competition law, meaning this isn't a settled finding but a live disagreement between the regulated industry and its competition-law critic.

Not a sector regulator — Ei holds that role; Konkurrensverket applies general competition law2026 review opened — March 2026, published as Analys i korthet 2026:3 (July 2026)Prior yttranden making the same argument — 2017, 2020, 2023

Konkurrensverket (the Swedish Competition Authority) is Sweden’s national competition regulator, based in Stockholm. It is not a sector regulator for electricity — that role belongs to Ei — but it applies general competition law across markets, including regulated natural monopolies such as electricity distribution.

Role in grid tariffs and flexibility

Konkurrensverket has periodically weighed in on Swedish electricity-market regulation from a competition-law angle, distinct from Ei’s sector-specific oversight:

  • 2021 — submitted a formal consultation response (yttrande) to Ei’s R2021:03 independent-aggregator proposal, critiquing the cost-cap design as an entry barrier that grows with aggregator utility, and flagging an implicit DSO metering subsidy. (Source - Konkurrensverket Yttrande Ei R2021-03)
  • 2026 — opened a review (March 2026) of grid-tariff (elnätsavgifter) pricing during the current tillsynsperiod, following public complaints and observed price increases; published findings in Analys i korthet 2026:3 (July 2026). Core argument: the revenue-cap capital-cost valuation method (nuanskaffningsvärde, tracking construction-cost inflation via BKI) may allow DSOs to recover capital costs exceeding their actual financing costs (which track KPI/broader capital markets) — a mechanism-level competition concern layered on top of Ei’s own acknowledged overcompensation finding. States it has previously argued Swedish revenue caps have been too generous (citing its own 2017, 2020, and 2023 yttranden). Review continues, with a stated focus on how DSOs price the final year (2027) of the current period. (Source - Konkurrensverket Analys i Korthet 2026-3 Prisbildningen på Elnätsmarknaden (2026))

Energiföretagen Sverige publicly disputed the 2026 report’s reasoning — see Source - Energiföretagen Kommentar Konkurrensverkets Granskning (2026).

Relationship to Ei

Konkurrensverket and Ei examine the same regulatory space from different legal bases: Ei administers the sector-specific intäktsram (revenue cap) regime under ellagen, while Konkurrensverket assesses whether pricing behavior within that regime raises separate competition-law concerns. The two authorities’ findings have so far been complementary rather than contradictory — Konkurrensverket’s 2026 report draws on and reinforces figures Ei itself published in Source - Ei R2026-05 Utfallet av Regleringen av Elnätsavgifter (2026) (koncernbidrag, internal loan costs, DSO profitability).

Relationship to other wiki pages

Data gaps

  • Outcome of Konkurrensverket’s continued 2026 review (pricing vs. cost analysis, 2027 pricing conclusions) — no published timeline

Sources

Närliggande sidorNearby pages 3

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