Konkurrensverket Analys i Korthet 2026:3 Prisbildningen på Elnätsmarknaden (2026)

Konkurrensverket (the Swedish Competition Authority), “Prisbildningen på elnätsmarknaden”, Analys i korthet 2026:3, published July 2026 (20pp). Covers lokal- och regionnät pricing during the current tillsynsperiod (2024–2027), analyzed from a competition-law perspective rather than sector regulation.

Background and method

Konkurrensverket opened this review in March 2026 after public complaints, market monitoring, and observed sharp grid-fee increases. It met with Energiföretagen Sverige, Skogsindustrierna, the three largest DSOs (Ellevio, E.ON Energidistribution, Vattenfall Eldistribution — together >90% of regional and >50% of local revenue-cap volume), one small municipal company, and analyzed open data (mainly from Ei).

Core finding: the revenue-cap valuation mechanism

Swedish grid companies are natural monopolies, regulated via intäktsramar (revenue caps) set in advance by Ei for four-year tillsynsperioder. The capital-cost component of the cap values all grid assets — not just new ones — at nuanskaffningsvärde (replacement cost: what it would cost to build the equivalent asset today), rather than the company’s actual historical acquisition cost. This is the kapacitetsbevarande princip already documented at RP5 Revenue Cap Methodology (2028–2031) › Capital base valuation — normvärdering.

Konkurrensverket’s specific competition-law argument: since 2012, construction costs (BKI, byggkostnadsindex) have risen almost twice as fast as general inflation (KPI). Because capital financing actually competes in a broader capital market (not the construction market), KPI tracks real capital costs better than BKI. Valuing the existing asset base at BKI-linked replacement cost therefore risks crediting DSOs with capital costs that exceed what they actually pay to finance those assets — a structural, mechanical source of potential overcompensation, independent of any single company’s conduct.

Key figures

• Total revenue caps (local + regional networks): 168 bn SEK (2020–2023) → 270 bn SEK (2024–2027), +61% nominal / +42% real.
• Capital-cost component specifically: local networks +97% (48.9→96.4 bn SEK), regional networks +127% (12.2→27.7 bn SEK) — the single largest driver of the overall increase, far outpacing planned investment growth (investment itself is roughly flat for local networks vs. 2020–2023).
• Calculation interest rate (kalkylränta) for local networks raised from 3.39% to 4.53% for the 2024–2027 period.
• End-customer grid tariffs 2012–2025: +70% (average villa), +60% (larger property/small industry), vs. KPI +30% over the same period.
• Market structure: ~20 regional-grid concessionaires, 145 local-grid concessionaires; Ellevio/E.ON/Vattenfall hold >90% of regional and >50% of local revenue-cap volume.
• Financial detail (drawing on the same dataset behind Source - Ei R2026-05 Utfallet av Regleringen av Elnätsavgifter (2026)): ~80 companies — just under half of Sweden’s ~165 grid companies (~20 regional + 145 local) — paid a combined ~20 bn SEK in koncernbidrag (group contributions) 2020–2024. Individually: Eon 8.9 bn SEK, Vattenfall 4.2 bn SEK, Ellevio 0.2 bn SEK. Internal loan costs as a share of net turnover: Ellevio 15.92%, Vattenfall 2.33%, Eon 1.05%.

Regulatory history: Ei’s own reform effort, blocked then resumed

Ei itself has stated the current method overcompensates DSOs and began developing a replacement — switching new-asset valuation to förmögenhetsbevarande princip (historical-cost valuation) for the 2028–2031 period (RP5), already documented at RP5 Revenue Cap Methodology (2028–2031) › Capital base valuation — normvärdering. This report adds the legal history: Ei’s first attempt (ahead of the 2024–2027 period) to compel DSO data for the new method was struck down by Kammarrätten i Jönköping (20 June 2023, mål nr 1448–1450-23), ruling Ei lacked authority to request the data as it had. Ei’s methodology work paused as a result, and Ei reverted to essentially the 2020–2023 method (with adjustments, e.g. to kalkylränta) for the current period. Work on the new method resumed under the current period, targeting RP5.

Even once adopted, the new method is prospective only — it revalues new assets from 2028 onward under förmögenhetsbevarande; it does not revisit the already-decided 2024–2027 caps or claw back the capital costs this report flags.

Konkurrensverket notes this is not a new position: it has previously argued that grid revenue caps have been too generous and should be tightened, citing its own earlier yttranden (dnr 535/2017, 134/2020, and 740/2023).

Overrullning mechanism

If a company’s actual revenue diverges from its cap by more than a threshold (>5% over, specifically), the following period’s cap is adjusted downward by a surcharge (or upward, within limits, for a shortfall). This creates end-of-period incentive dynamics: several profit-driven companies told Konkurrensverket they price to a small margin under the cap specifically to reduce the risk of triggering the surcharge.

Industry perspective (Section 5)

Grid companies raised: rising nätförlust costs (network losses) as electricity prices rose; the energy tax now being invoiced through the grid bill (inflating the visible price increase without a matching revenue increase); investment need; and that they are simply complying with ellagen and that any “overcompensation” is a mechanical result of BKI outpacing KPI, not discretionary pricing. Ownership form matters: profit-driven companies aim to price below the cap for margin/risk reasons (see overrullning above); ekonomiska föreningar tend to distribute surplus via lower prices; municipal companies vary. No company would disclose 2027 pricing plans to Konkurrensverket.

Continued review

Konkurrensverket states it will continue investigating actual prices charged during 2024–2027 against actual DSO costs, with particular focus on how DSOs price the fourth and final year (2027) of the current period, since companies have not yet announced 2027 tariffs. No end date given.

Relevance to the wiki

This is the primary document behind Energiföretagen Sverige‘s July 2026 public rebuttal (see Source - Energiföretagen Kommentar Konkurrensverkets Granskning (2026)). It introduces Konkurrensverket as an active regulatory actor layering competition-law scrutiny on top of Ei’s sector-specific revenue-cap regime — see Konkurrensverket. It substantially corroborates and adds mechanism-level detail (BKI vs. KPI, kalkylränta figures, the 2023 court ruling, overrullning-driven pricing behavior) to findings already in RP5 Revenue Cap Methodology (2028–2031) › Capital base valuation — normvärdering and Source - Ei R2026-05 Utfallet av Regleringen av Elnätsavgifter (2026). See Swedish DSO Tariff Reform — Three Parallel Tracks (2025–2027) for how this interacts with the RP5/TOTEX and förhandsprövning tracks.