Beredskapsflexibilitet

Beredskapsflexibilitet (flexibility for preparedness) — flexibility resources activated only under crisis conditions, where activation costs or disruption would be unacceptable in normal commercial operation. Split out from Flexibility (2026-09-05 structural review) as this civil-defense/preparedness sub-topic had grown into its own coherent section; see Flexibility for the wiki’s central flexibility concept and the four-category taxonomy this is the fourth category of.

Energimyndigheten ER 2025:35 formally introduces beredskapsflexibilitet as a concept — the practical content of the fourth category (flexibilitet för beredskap) identified by FlexAbility. (Source - Energimyndigheten ER 2025-35 Förbättra Flexibiliteten (2025))

The four system operating states

The report maps beredskapsflexibilitet onto the formal operational state hierarchy used by Svenska kraftnät:

Specific beredskapsflexibilitet capabilities

Ö-drift (island operation): DERs — solar, batteries, EVs — can enable parts of the distribution grid to operate as microgrids independently from the transmission system during major outages. Requires coordinated inverter control but no physical hardware change.

Dödnätsstart (black start): batteries combined with renewables can restart the grid from a completely dead state. Traditionally this required specific hydro plants with black start capability; distributed DER-based black start is technically feasible.

Synthetic inertia (syntetisk rotationsenergi / syntetisk svängmassa): batteries with special inverter control settings can continuously emulate the frequency-stabilising inertia of rotating machines. This is distinct from FCR/FFR (which respond reactively to frequency deviations) — synthetic inertia acts preventively and continuously. Svk explicitly identifies a growing need for this capability as synchronous generator capacity is displaced by inverter-based resources. See also Energy Storage › Grid resilience capabilities.

Distributed redundancy: geographically spread DERs create resilience through redundancy — no single point of failure. Contrast with the Berlin incident (September 2025): arson on two high-voltage lines (voltage not specified in the source) caused a 60-hour outage for 50,000 customers, illustrating the systemic risk of centralized critical infrastructure.

Compensation mechanism — still no flexibility-specific product, but growing adjacent funding: no dedicated beredskapsflexibilitet procurement or compensation product was found. Energimyndigheten’s dedicated energiberedskap budget line grows from SEK 54 million to SEK 398 million, and Robust Kommun — a support programme helping municipalities strengthen backup power and critical-function continuity — gives municipal-level preparedness a concrete funding channel, even though it still isn’t a flexibility-resource compensation scheme as such. Separately, Kraftlyftet, a new investment-support scheme for kraftvärme (combined heat and power) and heat-storage investments (SEK 100M in 2025 rising to 400M by 2027, cumulative SEK 5bn through 2035), funds physical resilience assets rather than flexibility services directly. (Source - Energimyndigheten ER 2026-08 Energiomställningen (2026))

Försörjningsanalys — testing the preparedness-planning methodology (ResiliENt Syd)

The ResiliENt Syd pilot (Energimyndigheten, Svk, Ei, and regional/municipal partners in Skåne/Blekinge/Kronoberg, 2026) was the first practical test of a försörjningsanalys (supply analysis) methodology applied specifically to the energy sector: behovsanalys (need analysis under a wartime scenario) + tillgångsanalys (supply analysis) → gapanalys → a feasibility×effect prioritisation of candidate measures.

The pilot’s central finding is a methodological mismatch: the generic MSB/Socialstyrelsen (now MCF) försörjningsanalys model is built around fastlagda tillgångar (pre-arranged reserved assets — contracted stockpiles, reserved production capacity, international arrangements), organised into five categories (end-user reserves, pre-distribution reserves, state stockpiles, reserved production, international arrangements). This model fits poorly for electricity:

• Electricity cannot be stockpiled the way goods can — only batteries, dams, and pumped hydro act as imperfect proxies.
• The model assumes markets are set aside for reserved assets during war, but Sweden’s national elförsörjningsstrategi (Svk 2026/1341) explicitly commits to keeping the electricity market running as long as possible, even in wartime — the opposite premise.
• The model assumes need for a critical good always increases under höjd beredskap; the pilot found need for some energy carriers can actually decrease, and that carriers are cross-coupled (a disruption in one raises demand for another) in ways the generic model doesn’t capture — e.g. district heating’s dependence on electricity means an electricity disruption risks pushing users toward direct electric heating, straining electricity demand further.

The pilot’s conclusion: for energy specifically, preparedness planning should prioritise flexibility and adaptive capacity to handle situations as they arise, over guaranteeing a fixed volume of any one energy carrier through peacetime stockpiling. Southern Sweden’s status as a net electricity importer was flagged as the area’s clearest structural vulnerability — an import disruption would force gas/oil-fired backup generation, straining diesel and gas supply chains simultaneously.

This methodology is not a one-off: Energimyndigheten confirms a national rollout of försörjningsanalys begins in 2026, using ResiliENt Syd as its direct methodological template — moving beredskapsflexibilitet planning from a single regional pilot toward a standard national civil-defence energy-planning tool. A related proposed 90-day endurance functionsmål would require critical kraft, fjärrvärme, and fjärrkyla infrastructure to sustain critical function for 90 days under höjd beredskap without external resupply — a concrete (if not yet adopted) target that beredskapsflexibilitet resources would need to help meet. (Source - Energimyndigheten ER 2026-21 ResiliENt Syd (2026), Source - Energimyndigheten ER 2026-08 Energiomställningen (2026))

Cybersecurity risk from connected DERs

RISE simulations on the Nordic32 test system (documented in ER 2025:35) establish that Sweden’s installed base of connected DERs is approaching a critical mass for systemic cybersecurity risk (not yet reached, per the report’s own wording):

• ~300,000 internet-connected heat pumps (vätskeburna värmepumpar) — a 2022 baseline per the source, growing as older systems are replaced
• ~1 GW / 1.6 GWh battery storage (end 2024)

A coordinated cyberattack — devices infected silently, then activated simultaneously on command — could cause grid frequency deviations outside normal operating limits. The threat is not individual device damage but system-level destabilisation. This is a generic risk across all internet-connected DERs.

Open communication protocols reduce this risk by distributing security responsibility across vendors rather than concentrating it in one proprietary codebase. See Flexibility Communication Protocols for the full protocol landscape.

The full treatment of the cyber-physical attack surface, the concentration-vs-decentralization tension, the NIS2 regulatory response, and the total-defence dimension is in Security and Resilience of the Digitalized Flexible Grid.

District heating’s security-of-supply target

The heat sector is getting its own crisis-capability framing. Energimyndigheten proposed on 1 October 2026 a national security-of-supply target for district heating and cooling: suppliers should be able to keep deliveries going for at least three months in peacetime crises, heightened alert or war, at a level matching total defence’s needs, and for at least two weeks mainly with their own resources. The agency also proposes a change in the district heating act so that deliveries can be adjusted and prioritised in disruptions, and judges the readiness value of existing reserve and peak boilers to be best kept through Energiberedskapsklivet support rather than a legal protection against decommissioning (Source - Energimyndigheten ER 2026-22 Stärkt Leveranssäkerhet Fjärrvärme (2026)). For CHP’s role in island operation and black start it wants a function-by-function assessment, since not every system has these abilities (Source - Energimyndigheten ER 2026-23 Fjärr- och Kraftvärmens Roll (2026)).

Data gaps

• Beredskapsflexibilitet-specific procurement/compensation mechanism — no dedicated scheme found; Kraftlyftet, Robust Kommun, and the energiberedskap budget growth (detailed above) are the closest adjacent funding channels, but none names flexibility resources specifically