Energimyndigheten ER 2026-21 ResiliENt Syd (2026)

Document: ER 2026:21, ResiliENt Syd i korthet — Ett pilotprojekt för försörjningsanalys i det södra civilområdet. Energimyndigheten, June 2026. A short (21-page) public summary of a joint pilot project with Svenska kraftnät and Ei, run with the södra civilområdeskansliet, länsstyrelserna Skåne and Blekinge, E.ON, the södra militärregionen, and local municipalities/energy companies. Read in full.

What it is

The first practical Swedish test of a försörjningsanalys (supply analysis) methodology applied specifically to the energy sector — for electricity, diesel, gas, and district heating, scoped to the södra civilområdet (Skåne, Blekinge, Kronoberg). Run under a specific dimensioning scenario (winter, a collapsed Russia–Ukraine ceasefire, Russian forces entering northeastern Finland, Sweden declaring itself at war, sustained remote strikes on Swedish infrastructure) drawn from MCF/Försvarsmakten’s 2026 civil-defence capability assessment.

Method: behovsanalys (need analysis, in two steps — select totalförsvarsviktig verksamhet from normal use via SNI codes, then estimate how that need changes under höjd beredskap) + tillgångsanalys (supply analysis) → gapanalys (gap analysis) → a feasibility×effect prioritisation matrix for candidate measures.

A real methodological mismatch — the report’s most important finding

The pilot tested the existing MSB/Socialstyrelsen (now MCF) generic försörjningsanalys model against the energy sector specifically, and found it doesn’t fit well:

• The model is built around “fastlagda tillgångar” (pre-arranged/reserved assets — contracted, statutory, state-owned stockpiles, or otherwise secured for wartime), organised into five categories (A: end-user reserves, B: pre-distribution reserves at distributors/manufacturers, C: state stockpiles, D: reserved production capacity, E: international reserved arrangements). Electricity cannot be stored this way — only batteries, dams, and pumped hydro can act as proxies, and even then it’s not “the electricity itself” being stockpiled.
• More fundamentally: the model assumes markets are set aside in favour of these reserved assets during war. But Sweden’s own national elförsörjningsstrategi (Svk 2026/1341) explicitly commits to keeping the electricity market running as long as possible even in wartime — the opposite premise.
• The model assumes need for a critical good increases under höjd beredskap. The pilot’s own analysis found need for some energy carriers can actually decrease relative to normal use, and that carriers are cross-coupled (a disruption in one raises demand for another) in ways the model doesn’t capture.

Conclusion drawn from this: for energy specifically, action proposals should focus on building flexibility and adaptive capacity to handle situations as they arise, rather than trying to guarantee a fixed volume of a given energy carrier through peacetime stockpiling planning alone.

Key substantive findings

• Southern Sweden is a net electricity importer — the report’s clearest structural vulnerability. A disruption to import/inflow would force increased gas/oil-fired generation within the area, straining diesel depot and tanker-truck capacity and the gas supply chain simultaneously — a direct cross-carrier cascade.
• For diesel: dedicated reserve stockpiles may be appropriate given a plausible new use case (fuelling backup generation at scale); for other carriers, the priority is instead maintaining each link’s own ability to keep the normal flow running, since normal flow is judged adequate to meet totalförsvarsviktig need if maintained.
• For gas: Sweden’s storage capacity is very limited, so maintaining continuous normal-flow supply and access to alternative fuels matters more than stockpiling.
• A generic supply-side capability direction proposed: build redundancy into the normal supply chain at every link (each actor able to sustain itself for two weeks, and to repair/restore after damage) — explicitly linked to ongoing civilplikt-in-the-energy-sector inquiries and the national implementation of the CER Directive.
• Demand-side finding: rising prices are judged an effective tool for reducing household energy use under strain; industry likely needs more direct/interventionist measures.
• A 29 January 2026 municipal exercise (with civilområdeskansliet, länsstyrelserna, municipalities, local energy/grid companies, the military region, Svk, Ei, and Regeringskansliet) found municipal energy use is relatively small in the aggregate, so savings measures there matter mainly for sustaining the municipality’s own critical operations rather than contributing to national-level reduction — and that short-term savings often carry serious long-term costs for life and health (schools, elderly care, water supply). Priority should go to identifying and pre-planning for the genuinely most critical local functions, not blanket rationing.
• Sector couplings (§3.1): disruptions to el/fjärrvärme increase reliance on gas/oil backup; district heating’s dependence on electricity is a specific vulnerability (loss of electricity risks pushing users toward direct electric heating, straining electricity demand further) — reducing that dependency is named as a concrete resilience improvement.

Seven proposed actions (§3.3)

1. Reduce inter-energy-carrier dependency where disruption risk requires it (investigation, information, oversight, funding support).
2. Analyse a likely increased need for tanker trucks under höjd beredskap (more fuel distribution to power/heat plants, more diesel for backup generators).
3. Investigate and secure fuel supply for electricity and heat production under höjd beredskap.
4. Work out in practice how totalförsvarsviktig users would actually be prioritised, per energy carrier.
5. Investigate and settle the national/regional/local responsibility split under höjd beredskap.
6. Work out which consumption-dampening measures apply and how (including the relationship between voluntary/mandatory dampening, elransonering, and MFK).
7. Develop the national försörjningsanalys methodology further — including data availability and how official-statistics collection could better serve crisis/beredskap analysis needs.

Relevance to wiki

Data gaps

• Whether the national försörjningsanalyser (beginning 2026 per this pilot and ER 2026:08 §5.4) have published results, or remain confined to sector-authority internal use given the sensitivity flagged in this report’s own introduction