Energiforsk 2026-1175 Kapacitet för Tillväxt Intäktsreglering (2026)

Energiforsk Report 2026:1175, Kapacitet för tillväxt — Omvärldsanalys om intäktsreglering (May 2026) — the revenue-regulation companion to report 2026:1190. Authors: Malin Strand, Madelene Danielzon Larsson, Mattias Wondollek. Describes how the Netherlands, the UK, and Spain are developing their revenue regulation (intäktsreglering) and the drivers behind their choices, as input to Swedish discussions. Heavy reliance on expert interviews (ACM, CNMC, TU Eindhoven, J.P. Chaves-Ávila) and CEER/Oxera/Ofgem documents.

Key claims

Netherlands

• Acute 2022–2024 capacity crisis (societal cost estimated €20–40 bn/year, 1–2× the Dutch defence budget) triggered a national bottleneck programme; ACM mandated to modernise connection-prioritisation rules and revenue regulation.
• TOTEX since 2001 (benchmark-based), but the fixed pre-period cost level under-rewarded the massive build now needed. Planned from the 2027 revenue period (a reform, “planeras”; the raw calls it “den kommande modellen”), the model stays TOTEX but shifts from benchmark values to actual costs: ex-ante cost assessment sets tariffs, with full ex-post truing-up of the difference → much lower investment risk, higher transparency/documentation demands. Flexibility and flexible connection agreements treated as first-hand measures, requiring CAPEX/OPEX-neutral regulation; ACM adopting more proactive supervision (cost-efficiency, data quality, operational capability; flexibility must be integrated into investment planning to avoid over-dimensioning).
• WACC: ACM proposes a nominal (inflation-inclusive) pre-tax WACC of 5.40–5.80% for DSOs for 2027–2031 (draft, under consultation) — front-loads allowed revenue.

United Kingdom

• Driver: net-zero 2050 + Clean Power 2035. Ofgem’s RIIO-ET3 (transmission, 2026–2031) final decision 4 Dec 2025; RIIO-ED3 (distribution, 2028–2033) proposed, following the same principles. Largest grid expansion since the 1960s; tens of £bn; more investment set ex-ante; fewer re-openers (stronger proactive-planning incentive, more predictable consumer costs).
• TOTEX since 2013 (RIIO = Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs). Per the raw’s RIIO-ET3 (transmission, electricity and gas) section, well-performing network companies can earn materially higher RoRE (this is transmission-level, not DSO-specific); real baseline WACC 4.5–4.7% (CPIH) for ET3, combined with benchmarking (“capex-outperformance”-style retention of savings).
• Flexibility integrated directly and treated economically on par with investment via “long OPEX depreciation” / “slow money”: a fixed capitalisation share of all costs is frozen, added to the RAB, depreciated and earns a return like capex (rest is “fast money”, expensed same year). Risk flagged: flex has short life / high reversibility / uncertain future value, so spreading its cost over time via slow money can make short-term solutions artificially attractive.
• (Per the raw’s distribution-network section 3.4, i.e. the most recent distribution period, not ET3/ED3 generally; “long OPEX depreciation” is sourced there to a personal communication.) Two explicit flexibility instruments: Flexibility Commitment Index (FCI) (rewards how well a DSO uses flexibility to defer/replace reinforcement) and Use-or-Explain (for every major reinforcement, the DSO must justify why flexibility was not the most cost-effective option). Plus digital-platform investment and standardised flex procurement to ease aggregator/FSP participation.

Spain

• Strongly centralised: tariff method and revenue model set nationally; tariffs fully harmonised (revenues go to the national system, not the DSO) to socialise build costs and reduce single-DSO risk from large industrial connections. No local tariff signal, no volume risk → the regulator steers via detailed rules, technical requirements, and mandatory processes rather than economic incentives.
• Planning via binding network development plans (NDPs) (DSO+TSO, approved regionally then by the state) — gives structure but rigidity and over/under-investment risk if demand diverges (DSO doesn’t bear the commercial risk).
• Historically capital-base/cost-based and investment-oriented; now moving toward an output-based, more CAPEX/OPEX-neutral logic. CNMC/MITECO run five flexibility pilots ahead of mandatory flexibility services from 2026; in practice flex is often activated via DSO requirements or targeted contracts since market-based flex develops slowly.

Cross-country comparison

• TOTEX: NL since 2001, UK since 2013, Spain not yet. WACC role: NL supportive (cost recovery / risk reduction), UK central but combined with output/delivery incentives, Spain limited (complemented by detailed regulation + binding NDPs). NL→actual costs + ex-ante/ex-post; UK→benchmark; Spain→partly actual. Differences between countries lie mainly in how WACC interacts with other incentives, not in how WACC itself is calculated.

Relevance to wiki

• Ei — international reference points for the Swedish RP5/TOTEX reform: the UK FCI / Use-or-Explain / slow money mechanisms for rewarding flexibility in revenue regulation, NL’s actual-cost + ex-post truing-up, and the WACC comparisons.
• Distribution System Operator (revenue-cap context), Grid Capacity Utilization (the regulation half of the capacity story), DSO Connection Queue Reform — The Swedish Policy Response (NL/UK prioritisation).
• Companion: Source - Energiforsk 2026-1190 Kapacitet för Tillväxt (2026).