Särskilt Yttrande SOU 2023:64 Marling Liljegren (2023)

Särskilt yttrande (dissenting statement) by inquiry experts Christian Marling and Ronald Liljegren, appended to the inquiry Översyn av regleringen på el- och naturgasområdena (I 2022:01), dated 2023-09-20, 12pp. Filed against the main body of the inquiry established by Dir. 2022:20. Sourcing note: the raw text of this dissenting statement identifies itself only as “I 2022:01” — it does not itself state the inquiry’s eventual SOU number (“SOU 2023:64”) or the report’s title (“Ett förändrat regelverk för framtidens el- och gasnät”), both of which are correct per other sources in this vault but not verifiable from this raw document alone.

Core arguments

1. Overreach relative to Tysklandsdomen — the inquiry’s proposed changes to ellagen and naturgaslagen go further and faster than the CJEU ruling (C-718/18) actually requires. Sweden should preserve as much of the existing regulation and case law as possible, stripping out only what genuinely conflicts with EU law.
2. Ei’s expanding powers raise rule-of-law concerns — concentrating both rule-drafting and rule-application authority in Ei without organizational separation is problematic; recommends separating the drafting and applying units within Ei, considering a board/governance structure (comparable to Riksbanken), and giving Ei significantly more resources to match its expanded mandate.
3. Revenue-cap deficit rollover (överrullning) should extend further than the inquiry proposes — deficits should be rollable over at least two regulatory periods (not just the inquiry’s conditional one-extra-period proposal), for both electricity and — especially — gas networks, where the current proposal risks stranding historical deficits.
4. Disputes that the särskilt investeringsutrymme law (LOSI) violates EU independence rules — strongly rejects the inquiry’s conclusion that LOSI (raw refers to it only by this abbreviation, not by statute number — Source - Överrullning av Intäkter Energiföretagen (2019-2023) separately identifies it as Lag (2021:311) om särskilt investeringsutrymme för elnätsverksamhet), which lets grid companies carry forward unused 2012–2015 revenue-cap headroom into investment-linked cap increases for 2020–2027, breaches the Electricity Market Directive’s NRA-independence requirement. Argues LOSI concerns deficit-carryforward rights, not tariff-calculation methodology — a different question — and that repealing it would breach legitimate expectations and property-rights protections (ECHR Protocol 1) built up via the prior Kammarrätten rulings on this matter — raw names Kammarrätten i Jönköping specifically for the later stopplagen appeals it lost, not explicitly for the original carryforward-establishing ruling (see Source - Prop. 2019-20-53 Underskott Elnätsföretagens Intäktsramar 2012-2015 (2019)).
5. Grid-benefit compensation (nätnyttoersättning) should not be removed — disagrees this producer fee-offset is related to tariff-setting at all.
6. Process and timing — preliminary methods should be published earlier with formal responses to stakeholder input in final decisions; and the reform’s then-planned 2024/2025 entry-into-force should be postponed — no other Nordic country was rushing equivalent legislation, and even Germany (the losing party in C-718/18) was phasing in its own changes only through 2027–2028.

The dissent closes by warning that rushed, overly broad changes risk reducing investment predictability for grid companies precisely when electrification requires accelerated grid investment.

Outcome

The government’s eventual Prop. 2025/26:26 (October 2025) sides with this dissent on two of its central points: LOSI is not repealed (contrary to the inquiry’s main proposal), and överrullning is not extended to two periods (rejecting both the inquiry’s conditional-extension proposal and this dissent’s stronger two-period-minimum ask — the government kept the status quo of one period). The government also delayed entry into force well past the dissent’s implied 2024/2025 target: electricity changes take effect 1 January 2027, natural gas changes 1 January 2026 — roughly in line with the dissent’s postponement argument.

Relevance to the wiki

Directly informs the legal history behind the Överrullning and särskilt investeringsutrymme glossary entries and RP5 Revenue Cap Methodology (2028–2031) › Capital base valuation — normvärdering. A useful example of a dissenting expert opinion in a Swedish regulatory inquiry substantially prevailing in the final government bill — worth noting alongside Swedish DSO Tariff Reform — Three Parallel Tracks (2025–2027) as a caution against treating SOU-stage proposals as settled outcomes.