Second Opinion Regelbördan Tung För Små Elnät (2026)

Title: Regelbördan tung för små elnät Publisher note: Second Opinion Nyheter AB, run on commission for Energiföretagen Sverige Interview: with Anders Mannikoff (VD Herrljunga Elektriska, ordförande Lokalkraft) Language: Swedish

Interview-format article arguing that Sweden’s DSO regulatory regime applies essentially the same requirements to a several-hundred-customer local grid as to a several-hundred-thousand-customer one, disproportionately burdening small DSOs and risking market consolidation. Note on source status: Second Opinion ceased publishing on 1 July 2026 (see Distribution System Operator and Swedish DSO Landscape for the topics this connects to); the site remains available as an archive but this is a closing-era snapshot of the debate, not an ongoing feed.

Key claims

Interviewee: Anders Mannikoff, VD of Herrljunga Elektriska and ordförande of Lokalkraft — an association representing ~30 local, customer-owned and municipally-owned elnätsföretag with ~350,000 customers combined. (Lokalkraft is not otherwise documented in this wiki.)

Core argument: the same regulatory framework applies in substance regardless of company size. Mannikoff does not dispute that grid operation needs regulation (natural monopoly, no customer choice of DSO) but argues proportionality is missing — “man måste också fundera över vad man vill uppnå med regleringen.”

Reporting burden named: economic reports, avbrottsstatistik (interruption statistics), tariff disclosures, nätutvecklingsplaner (DNDPs), and risk/vulnerability analyses to Ei, plus separate reporting obligations to Svenska kraftnät, Energimyndigheten, Swedac, Skatteverket, and SCB.

Cost asymmetry: large DSOs can spread compliance-system costs (documentation, processes, reporting infrastructure) across hundreds of thousands of customers; for a small DSO the same fixed requirements are proportionally far more expensive, shifting resources from customers to administration.

RP5 “effektiviseringsincitament” — a specific, dated claim: Ei will present a new revenue-cap (intäktsreglering) proposal this autumn (2026), to apply from 2028, that would include an “efficiency incentive” — companies with lower cost-per-unit get a larger revenue frame (intäktsram) and thus larger revenue. Mannikoff argues this could structurally favor large DSOs (economies of scale → lower unit costs) over small ones, independent of service quality.

Consolidation risk: if the trend continues, Mannikoff argues local nets risk being “successively absorbed” by larger operators — administrative cost alone becoming the driver of market concentration, not service outcomes.

Critique of Ei’s measurement model: Ei’s supervisory approach relies heavily on measurable parameters (avbrottstider, kostnader, investeringar, nyckeltal). Mannikoff argues this systematically undervalues qualities that are harder to quantify — local knowledge, proximity, fast response, and — increasingly — civil-defence/beredskap value (local presence of personnel, materiel, and spare parts mattering directly in a crisis, when resources based elsewhere in the country don’t help).

EU layer compounds this: new EU directives/regulations add requirements around digitalisation, information handling, cybersecurity, and customer-data accessibility — individually reasonable, but Mannikoff’s point is the cumulative effect (“Varje nytt krav kan vara rimligt var för sig. Problemet är den samlade effekten”).

Relationship to existing wiki topics