Forordning 2025-835 Kapacitetsmekanism (2025)

Förordning (2025:835) om en kapacitetsmekanism för elmarknaden — the primary Swedish regulation implementing strategisk reserv under Art. 2.22 of the EU Electricity Market Regulation (2019/943). Issued (utfärdad) 21 August 2025, published 23 August 2025, in force 1 October 2025. Full legal text (24 §§), signed by Ebba Busch. This is the primary statutory source behind facts the wiki previously sourced only via Svk news notices — full text now checked directly.

Key provisions not previously captured on the wiki

• EC state aid case number: the reserve must be designed in accordance with the European Commission’s decision of 29 July 2025 in case SA.112968 (2025/N) (§3) — the wiki previously only had “EU state aid approval was granted in July 2025” without the case reference.
• Definitions (§2): aktiveringstid (activation time) — time required for a resource to reach called-off capacity; resurs — a generation facility, energy storage facility, or demand-flexibility capability.
• Sizing methodology (§5): Svk must size the procurement using (1) expected loss of load to meet the government’s reliability norm, and (2) the value of lost load weighed against new-resource cost, to minimize societal cost. Svk may procure more than this formula implies if necessary given the bids actually received.
• Resource eligibility (§6): must be able to deliver in SE3/SE4; activation time ≤ 14 hours; must sustain called-off capacity continuously for at least 2 hours; must otherwise be suitable regarding availability and endurance; must hold required permits. For a resource located outside SE3/SE4, Svk must specifically assess how much of the offered power could technically reach the zones during a shortage. Note: the statute itself does not set a minimum-MW bid size — that is left to Svk’s own discretion under §9, distinct from the ≥1 MW figure the wiki cites from Svk’s own procurement materials.
• Demand-flexibility anti-cannibalization rule (§7): a demand-flexibility resource may only be included in the strategic reserve if it can be assumed the resource would otherwise not be used — i.e., genuinely idle/backup capacity, not capacity diverted from an existing market role. This is a real, previously undocumented constraint relevant to why household/aggregator demand response has struggled to qualify (see Strategisk Reserv › The CONE paradox).
• Cross-border resources (§§10–11): a resource in another state may join only if that state applies the EU Electricity Market Regulation and its grid is directly interconnected with Sweden’s.
• Contract options (§12): either (1) the coming winter period 16 November–15 March, or (2) a 2–5 year contract with delivery starting 12–24 months after procurement closes.
• Multi-year procurement cap (§15): capacity procured under the multi-year option (§12.2) may not exceed 70% of the smallest annual expected resource need for any calendar year in the contract period, based on the latest resource-adequacy assessment under Art. 23/24 of the EU Electricity Market Regulation.
• Multi-year generation must be fossil-free (§16): a generation facility under a multi-year contract must produce electricity using only fossil-free energy sources — the wiki already had this; the statute confirms it applies specifically to §12.2 (multi-year) contracts, not annual ones.
• Bid evaluation (§§17–19): best price-quality ratio, where quality = activation time + endurance; price is evaluated per unit of available capacity, per activation, and per unit of delivered energy at activation; activation time may carry at most 30% of the evaluation weight.
• Financing-deficit test (§20): required for bids from existing generation facilities with total installed capacity >300 MW — Svk must submit the calculation to Ei, which must approve it before Svk may accept the bid, and the bid must not exceed the calculated financing deficit.
• Activation limits (§21): Svk may only call on reserve resources to the extent necessary to maintain national system balance; contract terms must be designed so the reserve doesn’t unnecessarily affect electricity supply or market price formation.
• Non-delivery penalty (§14): a capacity provider who fails to keep a resource available as contracted owes compensation based on contracted capacity and the duration of non-availability, with a floor of at least the imbalance price (obalanspris) under Art. 2.16 of the EU Electricity Market Regulation. This is a distinct mechanism from the reserve’s own activation effect on the system-wide imbalance price (which the wiki already documents as VoLL or 1 EUR above the intraday technical price cap) — §14’s obalanspris reference sets a penalty floor for a non-performing supplier, not the system price during activation.
• Excluded companies (§22): firms in financial difficulty (per EC guidelines) or subject to an EC illegal-state-aid repayment order cannot be capacity providers.
• Fee basis (§24): fees under Lag (2025:50) §3 are based on electricity withdrawn for consumption at withdrawal points in SE3 and SE4.

Relevance to wiki topics